The evolving role of the investigative bodies of the United Nations Human Rights Council: more or less accountability for violations of international law? by Mägi, Merje
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
FACULTY OF LAW 
CHAIR OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merje Mägi 
 
The Evolving Role of the Investigative Bodies of the United Nations Human Rights Council: 
More or Less Accountability for Violations of International Law? 
 
Master’s thesis 
Supervisor professor dr iur L. Mälksoo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2015 
2 
 
ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................. 4 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 5 
1 Aiming at accountability through international investigations. The origins of human rights 
fact-finding ................................................................................................................................. 9 
1.1. Basis for fact-finding by the United Nations ................................................................... 9 
1.2 The „idea“ of fact-finding ............................................................................................... 10 
1.3 The definition of fact-finding ......................................................................................... 12 
1.4 Fact-finding methodology .............................................................................................. 13 
2 Accountability according to the Human Rights Council. Mapping the practice .................. 15 
2.1 Human Rights Council’s expectations of the investigations .......................................... 15 
2.1.1 In search of a clear mandate ..................................................................................... 15 
2.1.2 Identifying perpetrators ............................................................................................ 16 
2.1.3 Investigations on Israel ............................................................................................ 17 
2.1.4 Issues of categorisation ............................................................................................ 19 
2.2 Interpretation of the mandate – what the investigation delivers ..................................... 20 
2.2.1 Strict observance of mandate? ................................................................................. 21 
2.2.2 Qualifying crimes and perpetrators .......................................................................... 22 
2.2.3 Extensive interpretations .......................................................................................... 23 
2.3 Possible obstacles to the functioning of investigative bodies ......................................... 24 
2.3.1 Non-Cooperation with the state ............................................................................... 24 
2.3.2 Linkages with simultaneous accountability efforts .................................................. 27 
2.4 Follow-up to the investigative reports ............................................................................ 30 
2.4.1 Attributes of follow-up............................................................................................. 30 
2.4.2 Follow-up by the HRC ............................................................................................. 32 
2.4.3 Follow-up by the ICC .............................................................................................. 36 
2.4.4 Follow-up by states .................................................................................................. 39 
2.4.5 Prosecutions by third states ...................................................................................... 40 
3 The role of the Human Rights Council investigations .......................................................... 42 
3.1 Constraints of the United Nations .................................................................................. 42 
3.1.1 Vulnerabilities of the Human Rights Council investigative bodies ......................... 42 
3.1.2 An omnipresence at the United Nations .................................................................. 46 
3.1.3 The „political“ of human rights ............................................................................... 47 
3.2 The evolving framework of international law on accountability ................................... 49 
3.2.1 The indispensable sovereign will ............................................................................. 49 
3.2.2 The principle of responsibility to protect ................................................................. 50 
3 
 
3.2.3 The justice cascade................................................................................................... 51 
3.2.4 Universal jurisdiction ............................................................................................... 53 
3.3 Accountability beyond the Human Rights Council ........................................................ 54 
3.3.1 The framework to enhance accountability through investigations .......................... 55 
3.3.2 Cooperation with the ICC ........................................................................................ 58 
3.3.3 Accountability – not always through courts ............................................................ 61 
CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 65 
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................. 70 
ANNEX .................................................................................................................................... 74 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 76 
 
  
4 
 
ACRONYMS 
CAR – Central African Republic 
CoI – commission of inquiry 
DPRK - Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights 
EU – European Union 
FFM – fact-finding mission 
HCHR – High Commissioner for Human Rights 
HRC – Human Rights Council 
ICC – International Criminal Court 
ICTR - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IDF – Israeli Defence Forces 
IGO – intergovernmental organisation 
NGO - non-governmental organisation 
OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OP – operational paragraph 
OPT – Occupied Palestinian Territory 
OTP – Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
PLO – Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PP – preambular paragraph 
R2P – responsibility to protect 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN – United Nations 
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly 
UNOG – United Nations Office at Geneva 
UNRWA - United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
  
5 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Fact-finding has become a widely used means in international law to collect reliable 
information about violations, including in cases of alleged abuses and violations of human 
rights.  
As governments responsible for violations do a great deal to hide the signs of violations from 
international scrutiny, and even, or especially, in an era where human suffering in conflicts is 
regularly reported in the mass media, fact-finding has become an essential means to obtain first-
hand information of violations on the ground. 
This more recent investigations trend by international organisations has long been practiced by 
the human rights NGOs. Even more so, the modern history of fact-finding pre-dates NGO 
monitoring, emerging as a means of dispute settlement by mutual agreement of states, emerging 
in writing in the outcomes of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. 
The beginning of a significant contribution by fact-finding towards accountability for grave 
crimes was witnessed in the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia - the first war crimes court created by the United Nations, and the first international 
war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. It is rarely reminded that the 
establishment of both, the tribunals for former Yugoslavia in 1993 and, one year later, for 
Rwanda, tasked with trying individuals responsible for international crimes specified in their 
respective statutes, were preceded notably by fact-finding commissions set up by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations at the request of the Security Council. The Security Council later 
went on to establish an international tribunal in East Timor. Hybrid tribunals have been 
established by agreement with the UN to carry out prosecutions in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. 
Today fact-finding is used in international courts and tribunals, regional organisations and at 
the domestic level. In the United Nations, human rights related fact-finding may be mandated 
by its main or subsidiary organs: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human 
Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. There are a rising 
number of investigations prompted by the Human Rights Council to respond to situations of 
alleged human rights violations. 
As of late, the UN in general and the Human Rights Council in particular have been preoccupied 
with mandating ad hoc commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions to deal with 
accountability issues, including determining the accountability of specific actors - individuals 
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or groups, for human rights violations1. As a result, there have been increasing calls for 
accountability by investigative bodies in their reports, including for the case to be referred to 
the International Criminal Court. At the same time, there also seems to be more appetite by the 
international tribunals and courts and also by national courts to use the findings of human rights 
investigations. Yet it is still unclear to which extent this is feasible or desirable. 
The above developments have led to increased controversies over the nature and uses of fact-
finding in a situation where there is no common agreement on the commission or conduct of 
such investigations. Furthermore, although, as the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon already 
stated in the early days of the Human Rights Council that “All victims of human rights abuses 
should be able to look to the Human Rights Council as a forum and a springboard for action”2, 
this action has been seemingly lacking in relation to the outcomes of the HRC investigations. 
Although fact-finding has existed as a part of the international legal framework at least since 
the beginning of last century, may ultimately have implications on individual criminal 
responsibility, and is rapidly increasing in numbers, there has not been a comparable increase 
in the attention paid to these investigative bodies in academic literature. Most of what has been 
written on the HRC investigations concerns the so-called special procedures – independent 
experts and special rapporteurs mandated by the HRC. Accountability and justice in the 
international sphere is almost exclusively treated with a focus on international tribunals and 
courts, particularly the ICC. Fact-finding further arises in connection with international or 
domestic truth and reconciliation efforts. However, this connection remains marginal in 
literature and is often confined to the sphere of the domestic. However, lately members of the 
academia have started to pay more attention to the impact of investigations in relation to 
international law, including criminal law, and have become more responsive to discussions. 
The thesis, thus, sets out to make a contribution to the still emerging academic discourse on 
fact-finding mechanisms in the field of human rights by focusing specifically on accountability-
related justice fact-work mandated by the HRC, by exposing the seeming promises and possible 
misgivings in the HRC’s expanding practice on investigations. 
The aim of this thesis is to inspect the evolving role of the HRC’s investigative bodies in the 
international law and criminal justice framework, including, to what extent the HRC’s 
                                                 
1 See generally Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (ed.). International Law and Fact-Finding in the Field of Human Rights. 
Revised and Edited Reprint. Brill | Nijhoff: 2014. 
2 Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, 12 March 2007, Opening of the 4th Human Rights Council Session. 
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investigative bodies help deliver justice to victims of human rights violations. In view of the 
rare cases of real follow-up to the investigations it may well be that the endeavours of the 
Human Rights Council in establishing investigative bodies act as yet another fig leaf for UN 
inaction, remaining largely devoid of purpose. In the thesis I explore whether and, if so, then to 
which extent such criticisms are justified. 
Throughout the thesis I use empirical, systematic, analytical and occasionally historical-
comparative methods. 
In the first chapter I give an overview of the relevant legal framework and the basis for the 
methodology applied by the investigative bodies of the HRC. Chapter two contains an empirical 
analysis of the investigative bodies’ case-law of the HRC relating to accountability. I will trace 
the creation of mandates and the reports of the investigations. Among other aspects this chapter 
addresses the issue where most academic work and practical guides to investigations end their 
discussion, i.e the question of follow-up to the reports of investigative bodies. I hope to reveal 
some cases where significant contribution to accountability may be witnessed. The chapter will 
also discuss possible obstacles to the activities of the investigative bodies. The third chapter 
attempts to offer some perspective to the activities of the HRC in relation to international law 
and international criminal justice. Implications of the seeming convergence of human rights 
investigations and international criminal law will also be dealt with in this chapter. For an 
overview and ease of reference the thesis is annexed with a table of investigation cases so far 
mandated by the HRC. 
In order to clarify, the notions of „commission of inquiry“ and „fact-finding mission“ used in 
the thesis usually refer to the name of the investigative body. As a generic name, in literature 
and practice they do not seem to hold substantive differences as to their meaning, although the 
latter, an FFM, may imply a more narrow scope of action. „Investigative bodies“ is used as a 
common denominator for such entities. 
Further, when reference is made to international human rights law it is without prejudice to 
applicable humanitarian law, as the mandates of the HRC investigative bodies are often tasked 
to investigate abuses and violations of both human rights and international humanitarian law, 
including international crimes, and in light of the view that international humanitarian law and 
human rights law are widely considered to be mutually interrelated3. 
                                                 
3 In the basic document of the HRC inclusion of international humanitarian law is plaused by the complementary 
and mutually interrelated nature of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Annex to 
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In terms of scope, the thesis does not directly concern the work of the so-called special 
procedures of the HRC - mandates comprising of independent experts, special rapporteurs and 
representatives, working groups and similar posts, created with a country-specific or a thematic 
mandate. Whilst these wide mandate holders conduct a variety of tasks, including on-site visits 
and communications to governments they are independent in setting their agenda in correlation 
with their general mandate. The HRC has no direct power to order investigations by the 
mandate-holder in specific cases. The activities and the regulatory framework of special 
procedures will be considered where necessary. 
The thesis covers investigations mandated by the HRC as a specific UNGA subsidiary organ 
tasked with addressing situations of human rights violations. Its predecessor, the Commission 
of Human Rights and its five investigations mandated between 1975 and 2000 will be addressed 
where relevant. 
 
  
                                                 
the so-called Human Rights Council Institution-building package, adopted by the HRC in its resolution 5/1 of 18 
June 2007, Article 2. 
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1 Aiming at accountability through international investigations. The origins of human 
rights fact-finding 
 
1.1. Basis for fact-finding by the United Nations 
The implied powers of the UN organs to establish fact-finding investigations derive from the 
UN Charter, whereby the purposes of the UN are „to maintain international peace and security“, 
„to achieve international co-operation /.../ in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all“4.  
The Charter further foresees the right to investigate disputes or situations „possibly leading to 
international frictions“ or disputes in connection with the possible endangerment of 
international peace and security.5 Similarly, the UNGA Declaration on Fact-finding by the 
United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security refers to the 
context of disputes and situations „which might threaten the maintenance of international peace 
and security“6, thus providing an overarching „umbrella“ for action in a variety of cases. The 
tasks of the main UN bodies may also be transmitted, as both the Security Council and UNGA 
may establish subsidiary organs to perform these functions.7 The UNGA declaration places the 
main privilege and burden of information-gathering to the Secretary-General, the next in line 
being any other „competent organ“of the UN8. In reality, with some exceptions the Secretary-
General has only initiated investigations upon requests by the state in question. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the Security Council was the most active UN body establishing investigations9. In 
1991, a few of years before the creation of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and her 
Office the main actor deemed responsible for organising fact-finding in the UN was, perhaps 
understandably, the Secretary-General who was encouraged to step up the capabilities of its 
Secretariat to perform the information gathering tasks10. However, by now, the HRC has 
                                                 
4 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS xvi, Article 1, para. 1 and para. 3. 
5 Id., Article 34. 
6 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Fact- Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/59 of 9 December 1991, 
preambular paragraph 2. 
7 UN Charter. Op. cit. note 4, Articles 29 and 22. 
8 UN declaration on fact-finding. Op. cit. note 6, Articles 4 and 15. 
9 See full list of investigations mandated by UN organs: UN Office at Geneva. Library Resources. Available at: < 
http://libraryresources.unog.ch/coi> (as of 15.04.2015). 
10 UN declaration on fact-finding. Op.cit. note 6, Articles 4, 15, 28-29. 
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become one of the busiest organs in the UN to mandate fact-finding investigations, and the 
OHCHR offers UN-wide support to missions11. 
The rather wide basis for UN action on human rights derives from article 55 of the UN Charter 
stipulating that in order to have „peaceful and friendly relations among nations“, the UN 
promotes, among others „universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all12. In search for a more precise legal basis for HRC action when 
creating the investigative bodies than the UN Charter, no explicit reference to mandating of 
investigative bodies, other than the special procedures dealing with on-site fact-finding can be 
found in the basic documents on the creation and functioning of the HRC13.  
The resolution creating the HRC mentions HRC’s tasks very broadly: to be „responsible for 
promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all“14, needing to „address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and 
systematic violations, and make recommendations thereon“15, having to „respond promptly to 
human rights emergencies“16 and „make recommendations with regard to the promotion and 
protection of human rights“17. The aforementioned references to addressing violations and 
responding to emergencies were also cited in the HRC’s first investigation mandate18. A further 
resolution on HRC activities only extensively regulates the special procedures framework. Due 
to the differences between the special procedures and ad hoc investigative bodies it is not 
possible to apply the regulation directly to the latter. Nevertheless, due to the fact that both 
entities conduct on-site visits, analogies remain necessary.  
 
1.2 The „idea“ of fact-finding 
Fact-finding as investigations initiated by the HRC differ greatly from the „idea“ of 
international fact-finding, first agreed by states in writing in the Hague Conventions of 1899 
                                                 
11 UN Office at Geneva. Library Resources. Op. cit. note 9. 
12 UN Charter. Op. cit. note 6, Article 55.  
13 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/251. Human Rights Council. 15 March 2006; UN Human Rights 
Council resolution 5/1.  Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council. 18 June 2007. 
14 UNGA resolution A/RES/60/251. Op. cit. note 13, OP 2 
15 Id., OP 3 
16 Id., OP 5 (f) 
17 Id., OP 5 (i) 
18 UN Human Rights Council Special session resolution S-2/1. The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon 
caused by Israeli military operations. 11 August 2006, PP 4. 
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and 190719. With 177 ratifications of one or both of the instruments, the framework of these 
specific conventions remains theoretically relevant today20. According to these conventions, 
fact-finding by commissions of inquiry is applied to cases of dispute between states arising 
from a difference of opinion on points of fact21. This rather old mechanism is very much 
constrained by the will of the parties who, in the first place, have to agree to establish such a 
body22. The HRC, for its part, is not constrained by the will of the state in question. Moreover, 
fact-finding may take place when the state denies human rights violations. Any country may 
initiate a resolution at the HRC, including one mandating an investigation.23 There are further 
cases when a state is proactive for the UN to conduct investigations, for example in the case of 
investigations on ISIL activities in Iraq24. The HRC operates in a subsidiary capacity in 
situations where the state seems not to be able or willing to handle its obligations to efficiently 
investigate alleged crimes. In several cases discussed below, the investigations have taken place 
without the consent or cooperation of the state concerned.  
The mechanism of the Hague Conventions foresees proceedings whereby the „statements of 
facts“, and the witnesses and experts whose evidence states wish to hear are presented to the 
commission by the states themselves25. This is not the case with the HRC, where investigations 
include international open calls for submission of information26. The Hague Conventions 
curiously even foresee that the states should supply the commission with the means necessary, 
among others, „to accurately understand the facts in question“.27  
                                                 
19 For information on fact-finding before United Nations era, see Thomas M. Franck and Laurence D. Cherkis. 
The problem of fact-finding in international disputes. 18 W.Res.L.Rev. 1483, 1483-542 (1966-67); for another 
comprehensive overview of the history of fact-finding, see: Edwin Brown Firmage. Fact-finding in the Resolution 
of International Disputes – From the Hague Peace Conference to the United Nations. Utah Law Review, 421, 
1971, pp 421-473. 
20 The Treaty Database of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Ratifications of and accessions to the 1899 Convention 
available at: https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/002330, of the 1907 Convention: 
https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/003316. 
21 Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I), 29 July 1899 and Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes (Hague I), October 18, 1907, Article 9 in both. 
22 Id., Article 10 in both. 
23 To take action on a resolution, it should seek to secure the broadest possible support for the resolution, preferably 
at least 15 UN members. See: UN Human Rights Council resolution 5/2. Code of Conduct for Special Procedures 
Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council. 18 June 2007, Article 117 (d). 
24 UN Web TV. Adoption of Resolution A/HRC/S-22/L.1 - 22nd Special Session of Human Rights Council. 3. 
Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Shyaa Al-Sudani (Concerned Country), at 00:12:40. ... available at: 
<http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/human-rights-council/special-sessions/22nd-session/watch/adoption-of-
resolution-ahrcs-22l.1-22nd-special-session-of-human-rights-council/3762444519001> (as of 13.04.2015). 
25 1907 Hague I Convention. Op.cit. note 21, Article 19. 
26 Available on the respective web-page of the investigation. E.g: 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIEritrea/Pages/commissioninquiryonhrinEritrea.aspx> (as of 
15.04.2015). 
27 1899 Hague I Convention, Article 12; 1907 Hague I Convention, Article 23. Op. cit. note 21. 
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The operation of the HRC investigative bodies is discussed further in the thesis. What has, 
indeed, remained relevant of the conventions’ mechanism to this day is the fact that physical 
presence in a country takes place at the permission of the respective state28. 
 
1.3 The definition of fact-finding 
Fact-finding has been defined as “a recognized form of international dispute settlement through 
the process of elucidating facts29“, being, thus, related to disputes and used alongside other 
diplomatic solution-seeking mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation, good offices and 
arbitration. An impartial investigation should facilitate the parties in identifying a solution to 
the dispute 30. This does not seem to be entirely commensurate with the mechanism of the HRC, 
as there usually is no formal dispute between the HRC and the state in question, or a dispute 
between two states. 
The UN declaration on fact-finding of 1991 gives a broader definition of fact-finding as being 
„any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or 
situation which the competent United Nations organs need in order to exercise effectively their 
functions in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security.31“ This confines 
the substance of the resulting report to „a presentation of findings of a factual nature“.32 The 
UN declaration on fact-finding does not mention the need for consent of the state under question 
for the creation of the mandate. It is, of course, necessary to obtain consent to perform 
investigations on the territory of that state33. As fact-finding has been pursued regardless of 
consent of the state, it is wider than on-site visits, also performed by the special procedures. 
The UN declaration nevertheless foresees that the states „cooperate with United Nations fact-
finding missions and give them, within the limits of their capabilities, the full and prompt 
assistance necessary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their mandate“34. 
From the point of view and for the purposes of OHCHR, officially the secretariat of the HRC 
and also the organ supporting most of the HRC-mandated investigations, fact-finding is 
                                                 
28 1907 Hague I Convention. Op.cit. note 21, Article 23. Similarly in the UN declaration on fact-finding. Op. cit. 
note 6, Article 6. 
29 Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, Fact-finding, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford Public 
International Law (last updated March, 2011), at 1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 UN declaration on fact-finding. Op. cit. note 6, Article 2. 
32 Id., Article 17. 
33 Id., Articles 18-21. 
34 Id., Article 22. 
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described as „a process of drawing conclusions of fact from monitoring activities“. Although 
resembling NGO monitoring activities, "fact-finding" remains a more narrow term. The 
OHCHR specifies fact-finding as entailing „information gathering in order to establish and 
verify the facts surrounding an alleged human rights violation“ 35.  
With regard to its purposes, Ramcharan adds emphasis on victims as fact-finding should „help 
shed light on situations of concern with a view to facilitating the protection of those whose 
rights have been violated or are at risk, and to help bring about justice for victims“36. The 
OHCHR accepts investigations to be „a key tool in the UN response to situations of violations 
/.../, including international crimes“.37 
 
1.4 Fact-finding methodology 
Regarding methodology, the OHCHR deems fact-finding to pursue reliability, among others, 
„through the use of generally accepted procedures“38. While differing in time frames, tasks, 
scope and composition, all UN organs conducting fact-finding should apply the same 
monitoring principles and methodology39.  
As fact-finding is an ad hoc endeavour, its methodology has developed over time. At first, 
published guidelines on fact-finding were primarily intended for the use of NGOs, including 
the so-called Lund-London guidelines of 2009.40 In 1980 the International Law Association 
adopted the so-called Belgrade rules, i.e the minimum draft rules of procedure for NGO human 
rights fact-finding41. The Commission on Human Rights working group also drafted model 
rules of procedure for UN bodies dealing with violations of human rights which never received 
                                                 
35 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Training Manual for Human Rights Monitoring, New 
York and Geneva 2011/2015, No. 7/ Rev.1, 2015 version available at: 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/MethodologicalMaterials.aspx> (as of 16.04.2015). 
36 Bertrand G. Ramcharan. The UN Human Rights Council. Routledge, 2011, at 88. 
37 OHCHR. Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law: Guidance and Practice. New York and Geneva, 2015. ... available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf> (as of 20.04.2015), at V. 
38 UN manual on monitoring. Op. cit. note 35. 
39 Id., at 3. 
40 International Bar Association, Human Rights Institute and Raoul Wallenberg Institute, Lund University. 
Guidelines on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports ("Lund-London Guidelines"). 2009, at 
1. 
41 The so-called Belgrade guidelines: International Law Association. Minimal procedures to protect the integrity 
of human rights fact-finding by nongovernmental organizations. 59th Conference of the International Law 
Association. Belgrade, August 18 to 23, 1980. ... available at: 
<http://www3.nd.edu/~sobrien2/the_belgrade_minimum_rules_o.pdf> (as of 13.03.2015). 
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consensus support or official status42. A training manual for UN fact-finding was published by 
the OHCHR only a decade after the surge of UN investigations, in 2011, and is currently in the 
process of being revised43. Furthermore, as the main provider of operational, legal, analytical 
and methodological support to UN fact-finding missions, the OHCHR has gathered vast 
knowledge on the issue that has been compiled in a 2013 publication on the UN principles, 
policies, practices and methodologies guiding the work of the UN investigative bodies44.  
UN investigations have been a target for criticism, among others, for issues relating to 
methodology. Although today there is UN guidance on methodology emerging from ad hoc 
practice, this guidance remains at a high level of generalisation and is in no way binding. The 
OHCHR guides do not form any expectations to the investigative bodies relating to issues on 
accountability. It has been suggested that regardless of the UN and NGO manuals on fact-
finding methodology, the problem may be that the fact-finding „community has not accepted 
any methodological standards as authoritative“45. While the OHCHR agrees that there is no 
single format for the constitution and functioning of all investigative bodies, it believes that the 
methodological beliefs guiding investigations on human rights and international humanitarian 
law, developed „based on relevant norms, standards and principles“46, provide „a common 
thread across the various models“47. The difficulty lies with the fact that it is hard to trace these 
norms, standards and principles, which should „ensure the production of sound analysis, reports 
and recommendations“48. In the case of HRC information on fact-finding remains accompanied 
by somewhat differing descriptions of methodology used in each case49.  
In a situation where there is no single format for the creation and functioning of HRC, I proceed 
with an examination of the HRC practice in this regard. In order to reveal the aims that the HRC 
has pursued through its mandated bodies I start with looking into the terms of reference of the 
latter. 
                                                 
42 Contained in the Report of Working Group established under resolutions 14 (XXVII) and 15 (XXIX) of the 
Commission on Human Rights: UN doc. E/CN.4/1134 of 1 February 1974. 
43 UN manual on monitoring. Op. cit. note 35. 
44 OHCHR. Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law: Guidance and Practice. New York and Geneva, 2015. ... available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf> (as of 15.04.2015). 
45 Rob Grace and Claude Bruderlein. Building Effective Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-finding Mechanisms. 
Working Paper, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 2012, at 8. 
46 On applicable international human rights standards, see also: Ramcharan 2014. Op. cit. note 1, at 7-15. 
47 OHCHR guide. Op. cit. note 37, at V. 
48 Ibid. 
49Information on HRC investigations available at: 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx> (as of 18.04.2015). 
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2 Accountability according to the Human Rights Council. Mapping the practice 
 
2.1 Human Rights Council’s expectations of the investigations 
In this subsection I follow the HRC action in laying out its expectations to the investigations by 
way of examining the mandates in the respective HRC resolutions. 
According to the UN fact-finding declaration „the decision by the competent United Nations 
organ to undertake fact-finding should always contain a clear mandate for the fact-finding 
mission and precise requirements to be met by its report“, and „the report should be limited to 
a presentation of findings of a factual nature“.50 From the latter it may be deduced that in order 
for the report of the investigations to correspond to its tasks the mandate should also request 
only findings of a factual nature. Furthermore, according to the Belgrade rules, albeit for NGOs, 
the resolution authorizing the mission should not prejudge the mission's work and findings51. 
The total amount of investigative bodies created in the UN system has reached almost 60 
according to the OHCHR52. The total count of investigative bodies initiated by the HRC since 
its creation in 2006 is close to 20, i.e around one third of UN investigations. At the moment 
there are four ongoing investigations mandated by the HRC in cases of Syria, Gaza, Eritrea and 
Sri Lanka. The investigation on Boko Haram by the OHCHR should be effectuated in the near 
future. 
The mandates of the HRC investigative bodies and the contexts in which these mechanisms 
have been created differ widely. Few common elements emerge from the HRC’s practice. 
 
2.1.1 In search of a clear mandate 
While it would be beneficial to have an investigation mandate that would most likely provide 
information which can be further used to remedy the situation, it is somewhat surprising that in 
many cases the HRC mandates have been vague. For example, when establishing an 
investigative mission to Darfur, Sudan, in 2006, the HRC tasked it to „assess the human rights 
situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in this regard“53. At the adoption of the decision 
                                                 
50 UN declaration on fact-finding. Op. cit. note 6, Article 17. 
51 Belgrade rules. Op. cit. note 41, para. 2. 
52 A complete database can be accessed at the OHCHR website: <http://libraryresources.unog.ch/coi> (last 
accessed 10.04.2015). 
53 UN Human Rights Council Special session decision S-4/101. Situation of human rights in Darfur. 13 December 
2006, OP 4. 
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a positive statement among many similar expressed contentment over the „balanced text“ that 
had tried to take on board the „concerns of all parties“ involved and would hopefully allow 
benefit from an „efficient follow-up that eventually would be able to bring about a difference 
to the people of  the Darfur“54. In reality such a mandate fails to provide concrete guidance to 
the members of the mission about the actual substance and focus of its mandate. In case being 
a compromise wording, it would seem to compromise the efficiency of the mission or at least 
leave the focus of the mission unduly up to members of the mission to decide. Differences in 
understanding of the mandate by the HRC and by the missions are discussed in the next 
subsections. 
 
2.1.2 Identifying perpetrators 
In the most general terms and according to the traditional sense of the activity, human rights 
fact-finding involves gathering information to determine the occurrence of human rights 
violations. However, the HRC has expanded and, at the same time, specified the mandates in 
tasking the investigators to identify perpetrators and to make recommendations for further 
action. Such a shift may be seen as offering a more concrete possibility of linking the results to 
further accountability endeavours. As with the ongoing Gaza investigation, mandated in 2014, 
which is to establish the „facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated and to identify those responsible, to make recommendations, in particular on 
accountability measures, all with a view to avoiding and ending impunity and ensuring that 
those responsible are held accountable, /.../“55. Similar calls to identify perpetrators have been 
made in cases on Darfur56, Côte d’Ivoire57, Syria58 and Libya59. In the case of Syria, the initial 
mandate for the investigation in 2011 was to „investigate all alleged violations of international 
human rights law and to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the 
crimes perpetrated, with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability“. The 
                                                 
54 Explanation by Azerbaijan on decision on Darfur. 13 December 2006. Available at: < 
http://extranet2.ohchr.org/Extranets/HRCExtranet/portal/page/portal/HRCExtranet/4SpecialSession/DraftDecisio
n.html> (as of 15.04.2015). 
55 UN Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1. Ensuring respect for international law in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including East Jerusalem. 24 July 2014, OP 13. 
56 This was, in fact, an investigation mandated by the Security Council. UN Security Council Resolution 1564 
(2004) of 18 September 2004. 
57 UN Human Rights Council 16/25. Situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire. 13 April 2011, OP 10. 
58 UN Human Rights Council resolution S-17/1. Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic. 23 August 
2011, OP 13. 
59 UN Human Rights Council resolution S-15/1.Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 3 March 
2011, OP 11. 
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commission of inquiry ended up compiling a list of 50 alleged perpetrators at various levels of 
government and its agencies in connection with the information obtained. The list is 
confidential but direct link with accountability may arise as the list may be presented by 
OHCHR in the context of future investigations and possible indictments by a competent 
prosecutor.60 Views have been expressed that it is important to keep the confidentiality of the 
lists which could otherwise end up being „naming and shaming“ of individuals, having severe 
implications to their rights. Criticism has focused towards the possible lack of procedural due 
process with regard to fact-finding results identifying perpetrators, which may have adverse 
impact on the person’s rights61. So far the lists of perpetrators of the HRC investigations have 
been kept confidential62. 
Thus, the HRC mandates have come to contain various international criminal law implications: 
identifying perpetrated crimes and perpetrators - states, individuals, groups. The investigations 
are increasingly tasked to gather evidence with a view to criminal prosecutions63. This raises 
further questions, including on the standard of proof applied by the investigators64.   
 
2.1.3 Investigations on Israel 
A separate body of HRC investigations exists concerning Israel and its activities in Gaza and, 
in one case, in Lebanon. These mandates vary in terms of precision, but in many cases include 
a humanitarian law component, and have been widely commented for mandating investigations 
focusing on actions of one side to a conflict65. Already in the first HRC resolution establishing 
an investigative body in an HRC special session in 2006 the commission of inquiry on Lebanon 
was tasked to investigate human rights violations caused by Israeli military operations in 
Lebanon following Hezbollah attacks. Resolutions on Israel prevalently refer to international 
                                                 
60 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report A/HRC/18/53 on the situation of human rights in the Syrian 
Arab Republic. 15 September 2011, at 5, para. 13. 
61 Luciana T Ricart. Due Process of Law in the Fact-Finding work of the Security Council’s Panels of Experts: An 
Analysis in terms of Global Administrative Law, New York University School of Law, 2008. Available at: 
<http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/Ricart.ESP8-08.pdf> (as of 17.04.2015). See also: Antonio Cassese. 
International Criminal Law. Second Edition. Oxford University Press: 2008, at 416-17. 
62 The CoI on Guinea and Independent special CoI for Timor-Leste, established by the Secretary-General in 2009 
and 2006 respectively, did mention names of perpetrators in their reports. 
63 See also: Lara Talsma. U.N. Human Rights Fact-Finding: Establishing Individual Criminal Responsibility. 
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Issue 2 (August 2012), at 421. 
64 In terms of international criminal law, this standard is for the judges to be convinced „beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the guilt of the accused. See, e.g: Cassese. Op. cit. note 61, at 414. 
65 Criticism mostly originates from Israel itself and its proponents. See, e.g: PM Netanyahu and FM Liberman 
meet with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. 30 Sep 2014. ... available at: 
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2014/Pages/PM-Netanyahu-and-FM-Liberman-meet-with-UN-Secretary-
General-Ban-Ki-moon-30-Sep-2014.aspx> (as of 10.04.2015). 
18 
 
humanitarian law obligations. The CoI on Lebanon was tasked to „investigate the systematic 
targeting and killings of civilians by Israel in Lebanon“, „examine the types of weapons used 
by Israel and their conformity with international law“, and „assess the extent and deadly impact 
of Israeli attacks on human life, property, critical infrastructure and the environment.“66 The 
EU member states and some others voting against the resolution did not express any opposition 
to references on international humanitarian law, sometimes considered to be out of the scope 
of the HRC’s mandate67, but rather referring to procedural misconduct - lack of requisite 
genuine discussions, and the fact that the resolution addressed the concerns of one party to the 
conflict68.  
The issue of mandating the investigative body to look into the activities and alleged violations 
of one party to the conflict has been the common thread for all investigations mandated in 
connection with the situation in Gaza. The second investigation by HRC about three months 
after the first, in 2006, also concerned Israel and its attacks on the OPT in the Gaza town of Beit 
Hanoun. The mandate for the investigation was extremely wide, starting the enumeration with 
„inter alia“, mandating the high-level fact-finding mission to „assess the situation of victims“, 
„address the needs of survivors“, and „make recommendations on ways and means to protect 
Palestinian civilians against any further Israeli assaults“69. Again, EU and some other countries 
were against the resolution, referring at politisation of HRC, remarking that the HRC should 
address all human rights violations in an objective and non-selective manner, and that the 
resolution remained one-sided.70 The HRC continued to address Israel’s actions in the 2009 
FFM with a very wide mandate to investigate violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law by Israel particularly in Gaza71, producing the well-known 
                                                 
66 UN Human Rights Council Special session resolution S-2/1 on Lebanon. Op. cit. note 18, OP 7 (a), (b), (c). 
67 E.g in the discussion on drones. UNOG. Human Rights Council holds panel on remotely piloted aircraft or 
armed drones in counterterrorism and military operations. 22 September 2014. ... available at: 
<http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/BCE56ED914A46D40C1257D5B0038393F
?OpenDocument> (as of 22.04.2015). 
68 EU explanation of vote on Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1. … available at: 
<http://extranet2.ohchr.org/Extranets/HRCExtranet/portal/page/portal/HRCExtranet/2SpecialSession/Tab%2cTa
b6.html> (as of 15.04.2015). 
69 UN Human Rights Council Special session resolution S-3/1. Human rights violations emanating from Israeli 
military incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the recent one in northern Gaza and the assault 
on Beit Hanoun. 15 November 2006, OP 7. 
70 EU explanation of vote on Human Rights Council resolution S-3/1. Available at: 
<http://extranet2.ohchr.org/Extranets/HRCExtranet/portal/page/portal/HRCExtranet/3SpecialSession/Tab6.html
> (as of 15.04.2015). One-sidedness has been criticised to be replaced by even-handedness, e.g. by Geoffrey 
Robertson. Human Rights Fact-Finding: Some Legal and Ethical Dilemmas. 3 UCL Hum. Rts. Rev. 15 (2010), at 
23-24. 
71 UN Human Rights Council Special session resolution S-9/1. The grave violations of human rights in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza 
Strip. 12 January 2009, OP 14. 
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„Goldstone report“72. This FFM has been followed by several others73, including an 
investigation of the so called Gaza flotilla raid74. While being concerned at the lack of 
implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the FFM of 2009, latest in 
2014 the HRC dispatched a CoI75 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law in Gaza in the context of the military operations conducted 
since 13 June 2014. 
 
2.1.4 Issues of categorisation 
Regarding the possible responsible actors in the context of human rights violations, from some 
of the mandates it is apparent that the activities of non-state actors have been included in the 
investigation, either addressing them directly – such as the case of resolutions on activities of 
ISIL and associated groups76, and Boko Haram77, or indirectly, such as the cases of 
investigations focusing on Israel, implying activities of Hamas and Hezbollah78. Although 
fulfilment of human rights law obligations are primarily the responsibility of states, 
humanitarian law clearly incur obligations on non-state groups exercising de facto control over 
a territory79. Thus, the HRC has recently begun to turn its attention farther from states as entities 
with primary responsibility for protecting human rights to other organised entities. 
At times the HRC has created confusion of categorising investigations by not explicitly calling 
for a commission of inquiry or a fact-finding mission to be established. For example, the latest 
investigation mandated by the HRC in a special session in April 2015 is for OHCHR to collect 
                                                 
72UN Human Rights Council. Report A/HRC/12/48 of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict. 25 September 2009.  
73 UN Human Rights Council resolution 13/9. Follow-up to the report of the United Nations Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict. 14 April 2010, OP 9; UN Human Rights Council 
resolution 15/6. Follow-up to the report of the Committee of independent experts in international humanitarian 
and human rights law established pursuant to Council resolution 13/9. 6 October 2010, OP 8; UN Human Rights 
Council resolution. 19/17 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and 
in the occupied Syrian Golan. 10 April 2012, OP 9. 
74 UN Human Rights Council resolution 14/1. The grave attacks by Israeli forces against the humanitarian boat 
convoy. 23 June 2010, OP 8. 
75 HRC session resolution S-21/1 on the OPT. Op. cit. note 55. 
76 UN Human Rights Council Special session resolution S-22/1. The human rights situation in Iraq in the light of 
abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups. 3 September 2014. 
77 UN Human Rights Council Special session resolution S-23/L.1 (unedited version). Atrocities committed by the 
terrorist group Boko Haram and its effects on human rights in the affected countries. 1 April 2015. ... available at: 
<https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/SpecialSessions/23rdSession/Documents/A_HRC_S-
23L1revised1apr15at_1430adoptedextranet.pdf> (as of 15.04.2015). 
78 See previous subsection. 
79 According to the OHCHR the element of control over territory applies also for human rights law, see e.g the Sri 
Lanka investigation terms of reference: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/OISL.aspx> (as of 
15.04.2015). 
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information from countries affected by the activities of Boko Haram, and to prepare a report on 
violations and abuses of human rights and atrocities committed by the latter. As per HRC trend 
in general, the HRC tasked the OHCHR to investigate the issue „with view towards 
accountability“ 80. However, as opposed to other types of investigations, this investigation does 
not call for separate, non-OHCHR members to be used in the investigation, thus arguing against 
a „fully fledged HRC-mandated“ investigation. While the intention of the drafters of the 
mandate remains unknown, there are implications of a hierarchy between investigations 
fulfilled by OHCHR itself and those fulfilled with its assistance. It would appear to be based 
on an assumption that some cases are more in need of a fully-fledged HRC-mandated 
investigation than others. 
This is further supported by the case of the recent investigation on Sri Lanka where the OHCHR, 
in a way, „elevated“ its investigation by appointing three eminent experts, including former 
President of Finland Mr. Martti Ahtisaari „to play a supportive and advisory role, as well as 
independent verification throughout the investigation“ 81, without the specific authorisation for 
this by the HRC. Confusion also arose regarding investigation on the Sri Lanka which was 
initiated by the OHCHR82 and was later said to be mandated by the HRC83. 
Examination of the above HRC practice reveals that most investigation mandates have been 
worded in a manner providing a lot of „manoeuvring room" for the mandate-holders. Thus, I 
will next to look into the interpretation by and application of the investigative bodies of their 
terms of reference, in order to see how the investigative bodies have operated within their 
mandates. 
 
2.2 Interpretation of the mandate – what the investigation delivers 
A convergence between the formulation of the mandate and its effectuation by the members of 
the investigation should be desirable, at the least for transparency reasons. In this subsection I 
will try to find out to what extent the tasks set by the HRC have been met by the investigative 
bodies in their reports. 
                                                 
80 UN Human Rights Council resolution 23/18. Technical assistance to the Central African Republic in the field 
of human rights. 27 June 2013, OP 9 
81See OHCHR investigation on Sri Lanka. ... available at: 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/OISL.aspx> (as of 15.04.2015). 
82 HRC resolution S-23/L.1 on Boko Haram. Op. cit. note 80, OP 2. 
83 Report A/HRC/24/59 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Situation of human rights 
in the Central African Republic. 12 September 2013. 
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2.2.1 Strict observance of mandate? 
The UN declaration on fact-finding foresees that the report to be „limited to presentation of 
findings of a factual nature“84. Further, „fact-finding missions have an obligation to act in strict 
conformity with their mandate and perform their task in an impartial way.“85 In addition, the 
code of conduct of HRC special procedures that may be applied to other HRC investigations 
reminds us that mandate-holders must exercise their functions „in strict observance of their 
mandate and in particular to ensure that their recommendations do not exceed their mandate or 
the mandate of the Council itself“.86 
The latter guidance seems to leave no room to widening or narrowing interpretations of the 
mandate.  
The reports of the investigative bodies submitted to the mandating HRC are usually made 
public, and include information on their mandates, methods of work, factual and legal analysis 
of collected information, conclusions and recommendations.  
Already in the case first investigation mandated by the HRC, the CoI widened the scope of the 
investigation in line with criticism from the EU countries that the mandate was one-sided. 
Namely, the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon concluded in its report that while its first task 
to investigate the systematic targeting and killings of civilians referred explicitly to the actions 
“by Israel in Lebanon”, the responsibility of the CoI to investigate nonetheless „requires a 
consideration of all factors relevant to the actions of Israel in relation to the conflict in 
Lebanon.“ 87 Thus, the CoI itself „remedied“ or „compensated“ the „biased“ mandate. 
The CoI on Lebanon further confessed in the beginning of its report that it „cannot constitute a 
full and final accounting of all alleged violations“ due to several reasons, including the time 
constraint – i.e HRC’s call to receive information promptly – later agreed by the end of two 
months; the geographical reach of hostilities, and the displacement of civilians. The CoI thus 
oriented its inquiry on what „within the terms of its mandate representatively stand out and 
emerge as serious international humanitarian law and human rights violations.“88 Many 
following investigations have put forward a similar caveat89. 
                                                 
84 UN declaration on fact-finding. Op. cit. note 6, Article 17. 
85 Id., OP 25. See, also: Ramcharan 2014. Op. cit. note 1, at 3. 
86 Code of Conduct for the Special Procedures. Op. cit. note 2, Article 7. 
87 UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council 
resolution S-2/1. A/HRC/3/2. 23 November 2006, at 15, para. 11. 
88 CoI on Lebanon report A/HRC/3/2. Op. cit. note 87, at 17, para. 20. 
89 E.g HCHR report A/HRC/18/53 on Syria. Op. cit. note 60, at 4, para. 9. 
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2.2.2 Qualifying crimes and perpetrators 
Although the HRC had mandated the CoI on Lebanon to „investigate the systematic targeting 
and killings of civilians by Israel“90 and „the extent and deadly impact of Israeli attacks on 
human life“91, and did not expressly call on the CoI to assign responsibility or find out 
perpetrators of the possible crimes, the CoI, nevertheless, considered that the conflict gave rise 
to issues of international responsibility of Israel under international, humanitarian law and 
human rights, and the accountability of individuals for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights92. The CoI concluded that „the violations committed by 
IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] could qualify as serious violations of the laws and customs of war 
and war crimes“93 and that the report contains indications of conduct that „constitute serious 
international humanitarian law and human rights violations for which individual responsibility 
can be imputed“94. 
The CoI went further beyond strictly assigning responsibility by concluding that the deliberate 
strikes against civilians amounting to summary and extra-judicial executions of persons not 
only violated the fundamental rights of these persons but also constituted „a very negative State 
practice, extremely disturbing for contemporary legal culture“95. 
As opposed to the Lebanon case, in the case of Beit Hanoun, in addition to Israel the report also 
expressly discusses the accountability of the other party to the conflict by remarking that, „as 
the mission has repeatedly stressed (including to representatives of Hamas), those firing rockets 
on Israeli civilians are no less accountable than the Israeli military for their actions“96. The 
conclusions also make assumptions on the proportions of guilt, as the commission finds that 
„Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have human rights obligations towards the victims. 
Most of the ongoing violations, however, are caused by Israeli action or inaction.“97 
In its second report in the same question, the commission found that in addition to independent, 
impartial investigations to be conducted into the bombing of Beit Hanoun, also „a mechanism 
                                                 
90 HRC Special session resolution S-2/1 on Lebanon. Op. cit. note 18, OP 7 (a). 
91 Id., OP 7 (c). 
92 CoI on Lebanon report A/HRC/3/2. Op. cit. note 87, at 74, para. 341. 
93 Id., at 74, para. 342. 
94 Id., at 75, para. 347. 
95 Id., at 74, para. 340 (a). 
96 Report A/HRC/9/26 of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun established under Council resolution 
S-3/1. Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories. 1 September 2008, at 22, para. 
77. 
97 Id., at 22, para. 79. 
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must be established to bring to account those responsible for the launching of rockets towards 
Israeli towns.“98 
Investigation reports have further considered what law was applicable to the factual situations 
of the case, i.e have applied legal classification of the situation, and determined whether the 
situation is international or non-international, and which part of international humanitarian law 
applies99. After referral to the ICC, a day after establishing the CoI on Libya, the Commission 
further „considered events in the light of international criminal law“100. 
Furthermore, the question of mandates tasking to identify perpetrators may puzzle the 
investigators, as outlined in the previous subsection. Such case presents possibly opposing 
considerations of the demand of the mandate and the procedural rights of the alleged 
perpetrators. Again, a confidential list allows the mission to fulfil the mandate while still 
addressing concerns of due process for the accused, possibility of prejudicing future trials or 
posing a threat to witnesses.101 
 
2.2.3 Extensive interpretations 
From viewing the interpretations of the mandate-holders, while many of the commissions have 
a mandate by the HRC to engage in fact-finding, they actually do more than this and, as seen 
from above, often make detailed determinations on points of international law102, assuming a 
more legal character in their assessments103. In literature this has been explained by a struggle 
of deciding amongst the legal limitations of a mandate, professional norms of practice on the 
conduct of credible investigations and the humanitarian impulse to meet the needs of victims104. 
                                                 
98 Report A/HRC/5/20 of the High-Level Fact-Finding Mission to Beit Hanoun established under resolution S-3/1. 
18 June 2007, at 7, para. 19. 
99 Report A/HRC/17/44 of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of 
international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-
15/1. 12 January 2012, at 17-19, paras 50-56. 
100 Id., at 22, paras 68-70.  
101 Rob Grace and Jill Coster van Voorhout. Working Paper 4:  From Isolation to Interoperability: The Interaction 
of MRF Missions and ICCTs. The Hague Institute for Global Justice. December 2014, at 5-6. Available at: 
<http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/index.php?page=Publications&pid=179> (as of 17.04.2015). 
102 See also Dapo Akande and Hannah Tonkin. International Commissions of Inquiry: A New Form of 
Adjudication? April 6, 2012. European Journal of International Law blog. ... available at: 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/international-commissions-of-inquiry-a-new-form-of-adjudication/> (as of 15.04.2015). 
103 E.g see also: Robert Miller. United Nations Fact-finding Missions in the Field of Human Rights. Aust. YBIL 
40, 1970-1973, at 47. 
104 Rob Grace. From Design to Implementation: The Interpretation of Fact-finding Mandates. Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law. Oxford University Press, 2014, at 3. 
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The conduct of investigative bodies in overriding their mandates has prompted mixed views. 
The word fact-finding itself implies that the method should be descriptive. The question is, 
should it be only descriptive or can it add value in the form of a certain deduction, a judgment?  
Philip Alston sees extensive interpretation in a positive manner, noting that fact-finding 
mechanisms have experienced „a dramatic evolution, changing the previously fairly elementary 
documenting and reporting mechanisms into deeper analysis and more far reaching 
recommendations“105. Sometimes too far reaching recommendations may be witnessed, as 
above, when members of investigative bodies have interpreted their tasks to various degrees of 
liberty.  
At the same time, practitioners have called on the commissions of inquiry to refrain from 
voicing legal judgments on criminal responsibility and focus on establishing facts without 
evaluating them,106 that is, in general, to avoid legal determinations of complex situations and 
divergent legal determinations between different commissions of inquiry.107 
Ramcharan, once acting High Commissioner for Human Rights and a member of a many 
international investigations holds a very flexible view, without stating anything new regarding 
the role of the fact-finders, noting that the investigators „should act in a quasi-judicial spirit, 
and they should fairly present evidence that they have collected and analyzed and should not 
shy away from reporting facts and offering conclusions“. The latter might be the reason that the 
investigations always seems to deliver more than was asked. 
Next, I will explore the possible obstacles to fulfilling the mandate by the investigative bodies.  
 
2.3 Possible obstacles to the functioning of investigative bodies 
 
2.3.1 Non-Cooperation with the state 
According to the UN declaration on fact-finding, although voluntary, states should endeavour 
to follow the policy of admitting UN fact-finding missions to their territory, to cooperate with 
                                                 
105 Philip Alston. Keynote introduction. Fact-finding on gross violations of human rights during and after conflicts. 
University of Oslo. 17.11.2011. ... available at: 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/research/areas/conflict/events/conferences/fact-finding/alston.html> (as of 
17.04.2015). 
106 Geert-Jan Knoops, Blufpoker: De duistere wereld van den internationaal recht 94-95 (2011). Cited in: Talsma. 
Op. cit. note 63, at 386-387. 
107 James G. Devaney. Morten Bergsmo (ed.). Quality Control in Fact-Finding. Eur J Int Law (2014) 25 (1). 
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the missions, and „give them, /.../, the full and prompt assistance necessary for the exercise of 
their functions and the fulfilment of their mandate“108. 
Some states have said, especially in debates which preceded the setting up of the first expert 
group by the Commission on Human Rights109, that the human rights issues fall within their 
sovereign sphere and that article 2(7) of the UN Charter prevents the UN from intervening in 
the domestic sphere on these issues. 110 Yet it has been argued that with the adoption of the UN 
Charter human rights have become an international concern and are no longer a domestic 
matter, and that most states have accepted intervention by fact-finding111, including by way of 
accepting the UN Charter and the implied powers of the UN main and subsidiary bodies. 
Nevertheless, some states refuse investigations access to their territory. The cooperation of the 
state concerned is usually dependent on its acceptance of the investigation112. As a prominent 
example, Israel has refused to cooperate with any of the investigations or the OPT special 
procedures mandate-holder for reasons of alleged politisation and bias against Israel.113 
Regarding on-site visits Alston has noted that a major weakness of the special procedures 
system derives from its „inability to compel any particular state to cooperate either with a given 
mandate-holder or with the system as a whole.“114 Unlike special procedures, most HRC 
investigations in question have so far also operated without explicit state consent115. 
In the first year of the HRC, in the case of investigation of Israel’s actions in Gaza, specifically 
the town of Beit Hanoun, the high-level FFM, comprising of an odd number of members: 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Professor Christine Chinkin did not manage to get visas from 
Israel to travel to Gaza, which they regretted116. The mandate was clear on the on-site 
investigation, referring that the mission „travel to Beit Hanoun“117. The mission felt that without 
travelling to Beit Hanoun and meeting the victims and survivors, it would not be in a position 
                                                 
108 UN fact-finding declaration. Op. cit., note 6, OPs 22 and 23. 
109 Miller. Op. cit. note 103, at 43. 
110 Talsma. Op. cit. note 63, at 388. 
111 Id., at 389; Miller. Op. cit. note 103, at 48. 
112 Ramcharan 2014. Op. cit. note 1, at 39-40. 
113 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel will not cooperate with UNHRC investigative committee. 13 Nov 
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Ramcharan 2014. Op. cit. note 1, at 161. 
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to independently assess their situation nor to formulate recommendations for protection in the 
future. The option of interviewing victims in third countries was not feasible at the time118. 
During another attempt, in 2008, the mission decided to travel to Beit Hanoun via Egypt119. In 
the case of another investigation in 2014 the commission also regretted the failure to obtain 
access to Gaza by Israel after numerous fruitless attempts, but obtained indication from Egypt 
to facilitate travel to Gaza as soon as the security situation permits travel through its territory. 
Witnesses and officials have been met in neighbouring countries, information technology is 
used to interview witnesses and victims, both in Israel and the OPT.120 It is also important to 
note that while the situation of Gaza is not usual state-controlled territory, it is in similar position 
to other territories in conflict.  
Access to a state does not seem to be deemed highly important for a credible report any more121. 
Due to frustrating circumstances, the investigations are not finding access imperative, thus 
circumnavigating the hurdle of non-cooperation by states. 
Views differ to which extent the failure to have access to a country disturbed the investigators. 
In the case of Syria, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has seen the failure to have 
access to the territory of Syria hamper the investigation so as to limit its geographical and 
substantive scope122. In another case, the HRCH dismissed claims that the failure of a country 
to grant access to investigators would undermine the integrity of the investigation, rather „it 
raises concerns about the integrity of the government in question.“ He went on to raise the 
question of „why would governments with nothing to hide go to such extraordinary lengths to 
sabotage an impartial international investigation?”.123  
Usually, whether or not a country cooperates with the international investigation, the 
investigative bodies proceed as mandated and present their report to the HRC. However, access 
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to the country remains the desired case and it is reiterated in multiple fora by the HRC, the 
OHCHR and the civil society124. 
Also, reasons behind state action may be difficult to trace, as in some cases states seem to mind 
the appearance rather than the substance of investigations. For example, the government of Sri 
Lanka did not cooperate with the ongoing investigation mandated by the HRC. At the same 
time, it voluntarily hosted the visit of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, mandated to deal with topics similar to the HRC 
investigation, giving rise to possibly similar observations125. 
With reference to the cooperative nature of the HRC pursuant to its mandate to work on 
principles of constructive international dialogue and cooperation, with a view to enhancing the 
promotion and protection of all human rights126, fact-finding against the will of a country could 
be called counterproductive, e.g if there are recommendations which the state does not accept. 
This would cause further discreditation of the CoI and lead to ineffectiveness. On the other 
hand, a CoI with full consent of every state would prove flawed thinking, as it would neutralise 
the activities of the HRC.  
 
2.3.2 Linkages with simultaneous accountability efforts 
In relation to its fact-finding work the HRC should to bear in mind other relevant fact-finding 
efforts, including those undertaken by the States concerned, and in the framework of regional 
arrangements or agencies127. 
There are many instances where the HRC mandates investigations while other UN or non-UN 
efforts are underway. Not to be considered an obstacle per se in every situation, linkages with 
other accountability efforts may render the work of the investigations less meaningful. 
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As observed already above, the HRC has ordered investigations in relation to the activities of 
Israel several times. In 2009 it dispatched an FFM with a very wide mandate to investigate 
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by Israel 
throughout the OPT, and particularly in Gaza128. In April 2010 it established a follow-up 
committee of independent experts to the above-mentioned FFM report129, and in October 2010 
renewed the committee of experts130. The first time around the independent experts were 
mandated, in light of an UNGA resolution, to monitor and assess domestic proceedings of both 
Israel and Palestine to investigate violations of international humanitarian and international 
human rights law reported by the FFM.131 There was opposition to the mandate indicating that 
it duplicated efforts, as the UNGA resolution had already requested the Secretary-General to 
report on the implementation of the resolution calling for investigations from both sides. As 
that report was pending, it would have been contradictory to take further monitoring action on 
domestic investigations.132. More rigidly put, international oversight of domestic legal 
processes cannot be supported when there is no indication that they would not deal with alleged 
abuses133. 
In the case of Darfur, the Secretary-General set up a CoI on Darfur in 2004 to „investigate 
reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all 
parties“, to determine „whether or not acts of genocide have occurred“, and to „identify the 
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held 
accountable“ 134. In its report in January 2005 the five-member CoI, headed by Antonio Cassese, 
recommended that the Security Council refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC135, and also 
recommended the then Commission on Human Rights to re-establish the special procedures 
mandate-holder on human rights in Sudan136. However, the HRC decided to dispatch a High-
Level Mission to assess the human rights situation in Darfur in December 2006, while the case 
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had already been referred to the ICC by the Security Council in March 2005137. Furthermore, 
while the commission focused on incidents that had occurred from February 2003 and mid-
January 2005138, the ICC has more extensive jurisdiction over situation in Darfur, i.e as of 1 
June 2002139.  
In the light of the above, it may be noted that communication and coordination with tribunals 
or accountability mechanisms of other states are rarely explicitly present in mandates. As a 
positive exception, in 2012 the HRC requested the CoI on Syria to gather information about an 
incident in May 2012, and „preserve the evidence of crimes for possible future criminal 
prosecutions or a future justice process“140.  
It is still apparent that the HRC investigations „compete“ with other, mainly UN, endeavours 
with regard to human rights, humanitarian and criminal law. For example, the most recent 
investigation initiated by the HRC, on Boko Haram141 might duplicate the investigation already 
underway in the ICC, where the Office has already determined that there is a reasonable basis 
to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed in Nigeria, namely acts of murder 
and persecution attributed to Boko Haram. The Office currently looks into the admissibility of 
the case by assessing whether the national authorities have been conducting genuine 
proceedings in relation to those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes142. Although 
the scope of the HRC-mandated investigation covers countries affected by Boko Haram’s acts, 
i.e also Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, Nigeria remains the most affected. In case no value 
is added by the HRC investigation to the comprehensive investigation by the ICC underway, 
this could sign opposing the ICC investigation. Moreover, as opposed to resolutions where the 
HRC has called upon ICC referral, and action the resolution on Boko Haram dismisses the ICC 
phase and instead calls upon the affected states to try the perpetrators of the crimes committed 
by Boko Haram in their competent courts to ensure accountability143, i.e the very fact that the 
subsidiary ICC mechanism is already looking into. 
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The possible substantial overlap of mandates of the investigative body and special procedures 
needs closer attention as the entities usually perform different tasks. Although the special 
procedures are able to perform on-site visits, their code of conduct foresees consent or invitation 
applied to the conduct of a field visit and is, in general, more cooperation-oriented144. The same 
applies to OHCHR field offices. Overlap with the work of the special procedures of the HRC 
may still happen, as they are in place for many of the situations where HRC has mandated ad 
hoc investigations such as Eritrea, the DPRK, Sudan and the OPT. However, in the cases of 
Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire and Syria, the special procedures mandate-holder has 
not preceded, but followed the investigation145.  Regarding thematic rapporteurs, the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence is 
also active on countries that have been subjected to the scrutiny of HRC investigations. 
In the next section I will go beyond the investigations phase and examine what the HRC has 
done to try to enhance implementation of the investigation reports concerning promotion of 
accountability. 
 
2.4 Follow-up to the investigative reports  
In the 16th century, father Bartolomé de Las Casas conducted field research on crimes 
committed by Spanish conquerors against the American population. His call, at the end of his 
reports, to the congregation of the faithful to stop the crimes may be considered a precedent for 
the appeals to the international community that are the implication of the human rights reports 
today.146 
 
2.4.1 Attributes of follow-up 
According to a positive description by the OHCHR, investigative bodies have proven to be 
valuable in countering impunity by promoting accountability for violations. They gather and 
verify information, create an historical record of events, and provide a basis for further 
investigations. They also recommend measures to redress violations, provide justice and 
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reparation to victims, and hold perpetrators to account147. 
According to both of the final documents of the Hague Conferences on dispute settlement, the 
report of the commission in no way had the character of an award, leaving to the parties entire 
freedom as to the effect to be given to the statement148. While the 1899 convention foresees the 
report of the commission to be submitted to the conflicting parties, leaving its fate to the parties 
involved149, the 1907 convention has ventured to have the report read at a public sitting, at the 
attendance of the agents and counsel of the parties150.  Regardless of this, nothing reminiscent 
of a follow-up or an appeal is envisaged in these instruments. The report has no legally binding 
nature on the parties.  
In case of alleged violations, post-investigation and pre-accountability is the space that should 
be invaded by all possible follow-up. In a similar context, the term „utilisation of reports“ can 
be used. 
According to the manual of operations of the HRC special procedures, follow-up to country 
visits may take the form of either: 1) formulating their recommendations in ways that facilitate 
implementation and monitoring; 2) undertaking follow-up initiatives through communications 
and further visits; and 3) cooperating with relevant partners151. It is, however, argued that 
instead of facilitation of implementation, for HRC investigations formulation of 
recommendations should first be guided by the necessity to make them. Further visits by the 
investigative body depend on the HRC. The missions are usually dispatched once. Certain 
missions, such as on Syria and the OPT, are often basically renewed. Cooperation with relevant 
partners could mean inter-UN cooperation and referral, which is the main fate of the HRC 
investigation reports. 
As a possibility, the OHCHR could perform follow-up, to see over the implementation of 
recommendations. The OHCHR is independent from the HRC and states and could be 
especially useful when it has a country office in the particular country. 
With regard to recommendations, according to the OHCHR, they should be specific, 
measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound (=S.M.A.R.T.)152. This approach implies that 
recommendations hold different degrees as to the possibility of their implementation. 
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Alston has further noted a „major broadening of remedial and institutional options in terms of 
the outcomes of human rights fact-finding – the whole spectrum, from avoidance of criminal 
responsibility issues all the way to the detailed naming and strong recommendations for 
criminal prosecutions with the crimes being specified“153.  
I will next seek to find out how the HRC has given use to the recommendations. 
 
2.4.2 Follow-up by the HRC 
It is possible to examine that, so far, no actual follow-up has been conducted in the case of 
Libya. In the last resolution on Libya’s CoI, established in 2011, the HRC takes note of the 
second and final report of the CoI, and encourages the transitional Government of Libya to 
implement the recommendations addressed to it154. At the same time, in its final report, the CoI 
on Libya has presented many recommendations to the Government of Libya155, which were not 
addressed in the follow-up resolution. Starting another round in the investigations circle, during 
the HRC March session of 2015, the HRC dispatched a new mission on Libya to investigate 
violations and abuses of international human rights law that have been committed in Libya since 
the beginning of 2014, and to establish their facts and circumstances with a view to ensuring 
full accountability156. 
In the report of the CoI on Israel’s attacks in Lebanon the CoI made a very general 
recommendation that „the HRC should establish a follow-up procedure to monitor the human 
rights situation in Lebanon, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the 
report“157. Actual follow-up was requested by the HRC from the OHCHR who was to 
coordinate the implementation of the recommendations of the respective CoI. After an initial 
report to the HRC at a further session the OHCHR presented a rather comprehensive report on 
the follow-up activities as per recommended by the CoI158. The activities ranging from 
humanitarian aid and reconstruction to weapons and vulnerable groups were sought to integrate 
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human rights in the recovery process. Thus, for Lebanon, there was HRC follow-up and 
seeming relief from the investigation.  
However, attempts to follow-up on investigations on Gaza have yielded no significant results. 
The HRC continued to address Israel’s actions in the 2009 FFM with a very wide mandate to 
investigate violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by 
Israel particularly in Gaza159, producing the „Goldstone report“160.The resolution 13/9 holds 
many follow-up paragraphs, including requesting the Secretary-General present a 
comprehensive report on the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Goldstone Fact-Finding Mission by all concerned parties, including United Nations 
bodies161. The report of the Secretary-General was indeed comprehensive, including revealing 
the fact that the HRC had transmitted the report of the mission to the Prosecutor of the ICC, but 
had failed to forward the report to the Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter162. The 
Security Council had failed to require Israel to take steps to launch appropriate investigations 
into violations. There were no significant effects of the follow-up. 
Among other endeavours, the HRC has establishing a follow-up committee of independent 
experts to the Goldstone report163 in April 2010, and in October 2010 renewing the committee 
of experts164. After further investigations on the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying 
humanitarian assistance to Gaza165 in 2010 and in the OPT in 2012166, yet again in July 2014, 
including while being concerned at the lack of implementation of the recommendations 
contained in the report of the FFM of 2009, the HRC dispatched a CoI to investigate violations 
of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Gaza in the context of 
the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014.  
The investigations of Israel’s activities are not accompanied by effectuation of the former’s 
recommendations, and build up on overlapping recommendations addressing violations. 
Descriptive of the situation, in the second report of the Beit Hanoun investigation it was noted 
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that „one victim of the Beit Hanoun shelling was the rule of law. There has been no 
accountability for an act that killed 19 people and injured many more“.167 
In another case, the investigation of alleged violations and abuses of international human rights 
law committed by ISIL and associated terrorist groups in Iraq, mandated by the HRC at a special 
session in September 2014 saw basically no follow-up. The OHCHR presented its report in 
March 2015 session and the HRC adopted a brief resolution taking note of the report and asking 
the HCHR to provide technical assistance to Iraq and report on it168. At the same time the 
OHCHR had expanded the scope of the mandate given by the HRC and foreseen possible 
violation of international law in addition to individual responsibility also the state responsibility 
to be borne by Iraq as the main guarantor of protection of human rights on its territory.169 The 
OHCHR made many specific recommendations to Iraq, including acceding to the Rome Statute 
etc. Possibly the issue was with the unfortunate late submission of the report and some 
additional follow-up fill follow in the future. Thus far accountability has not been reached 
through effectuation of the OHCHR report. 
Latest, as the recommendations over the years of the CoI on Syria for the situation to be referred 
to the ICC by the Security Council, and not seeing any movement in the realisation of this 
recommendation, the CoI has now turned to other possibilities in search for justice, specifically 
third country criminal proceedings170. 
The most extensive and comprehensive set of recommendations for achieving accountability 
may be found in the report of the CoI on DPRK171. In addition to recommendations to DPRK, 
its neighbouring states and the UN organs, it specified a recommendation to the HCHR with 
support from HRC and UNGA to establish a structure to help ensure accountability for human 
rights violations in the DPRK, which „should build on the collection of evidence and 
documentation work of the commission, and further expand its database“172. Furthermore, the 
work of such a structure should „facilitate United Nations efforts to prosecute, or otherwise 
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render accountable, those most responsible for crimes against humanity“173. The 
recommendation on the field-based structure was effectuated by the HRC in its respective 
resolution174 and such an office is yet to be established, possibly to be hosted by the Republic 
of Korea175. The CoI report was lately discussed at the Security Council, albeit without concrete 
commitments176. While the HRC showed some fatigue and avoided pressing explicitly on ICC 
issues during its past session, it agreed to hold a panel discussion on the DPRK in September 
2015177. 
The usual practice of the HRC in follow-up that can be deduced upon examination of the cases 
is to for it to task the follow-up activity with the HCHR or the Secretary-General, expect a 
report on follow-up activities, possibly discuss it in the HRC session and include in another 
resolution. As an alternative, no follow-up is mentioned in the respective resolution after 
receiving a report, or some paragraphs are picked out from the report and inserted to the 
resolution. 
Although UNGA „may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, 
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations 
among nations“178, it rarely follows up on HRC resolutions. 
A 2011 review concluded that the HRC’s political response to possible forms of justice in 
situations of gross, systematic human rights violations has been „selective and lacks follow-
through“. Further, implementation of recommendations by human rights mechanisms on 
accountability for violations is rarely monitored, negatively impacting HRC’s credibility179. 
This lack of action has been attributed to lack of political will180. 
Taking no action defies the purpose of investigations in most cases. Indeed, a connection exists 
between the HRC mandate, its interpretation and the actual work of the investigators. One might 
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hope that the quality of the work of the investigators would facilitate its follow-up by the HRC. 
However, so far, no noticeable pattern for follow-up by the HRC has emerged.  
In connection with HRC special procedures fact-finding, Philip Alston has noted one of the 
evident purposes of the reports, which is oftentimes „designed to mobilize pressure from peers 
or other stakeholders, with a view to inducing compliance by the state concerned“181. 
 
2.4.3 Follow-up by the ICC 
Prior to the 1990s, the UN responses to fact-finding had been mostly political - urging 
governments to take positive action. However, since then, the reports of investigations have 
increasingly led to responses of a more criminal nature.182 
The UN Security Council has been authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to refer 
cases to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC upon the creation of the Court.183 At present, 
there are no obstructions to use the results of fact-finding for such referrals. 
Nevertheless, so far, follow-up to an HRC investigation by way of a referral to the ICC has 
remained a recommendation „on paper“. In the case of fact-finding on violations in Gaza, the 
HRC did forward the report of the mission to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, although 
without results184, even though referrals to the ICC have been recommended by investigations 
several times185.  
Lately, most notably Judge Michael Kirby who served as Head of the CoI on DPRK has become 
an outspoken advocate for using the findings of the investigation in future accountability 
efforts.186 While the DPRK CoI report has circulated in the UN system since its publication in 
March 2014, in late 2014 there was an exceptional case where, for the first time, the UNGA 
submitted a HRC CoI report on DPRK to the Security Council, and among other measures, 
encouraged the latter to take appropriate action to ensure accountability, including considering 
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the referral of the situation in the DPRK to the ICC187. Although in reality the CoI report had 
already been communicated to the Security Council by some member states in spring 2014188, 
the UNGA submission needs an official Security Council consideration, yet to take place. 
While the CoI on Syria, perhaps as a sign of fatigue, called for referral of the case by the 
Security Council „to justice“, mentioning an ad hoc criminal tribunal as an alternative to the 
ICC189, the HRC opted to still emphasise the important role of the ICC, but left the appropriate 
action open to the Security Council190. 
In several further cases the HRC investigation reports have made allegations of violations of 
the Rome Statute, either in stronger or weaker language. For example, in conditions where it 
seems that definite proof was lacking the second report on Beit Hanoun concluded that „in the 
absence of a well-founded explanation from the Israeli military (who is in sole possession of 
the relevant facts), the mission must conclude that there is a possibility that the shelling of Beit 
Hanoun constituted a war crime as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court“191. 
In terms of follow-up on accountability, notwithstanding not addressing it at all, the HRC has 
sometimes failed to directly tackle the investigation’s call for accountability. For example, in 
the interim report on the CAR, the sole recommendation of the HCHR to the HRC was to 
appoint a special procedure on the situation of CAR „to ensure accountability for serious 
crimes, by means of referral to justice, possibly to the International Criminal Court“192. The 
HRC did respond by appointing an independent expert on CAR193, however, with a mandate 
differing from the one envisaged by the HRCR. Namely, while the HRC „took note with 
appreciation“ of the interim report of the HCHR194 - the latter two words implying less 
contradictions between states as to the substance of the report, and also called on authorities to 
take steps to ensure there be no impunity for perpetrators of crimes195, it appointed the 
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independent expert to monitor the human rights situation in CAR, and to make 
recommendations merely concerning technical assistance and capacity-building in the field of 
human rights196.  
While also mentioning obligations deriving from the Rome Statute and the actions of the ICC 
with regard to the case of CAR, in its resolution the Security Council expressed support to the 
work of the independent expert in the context of the need to bolster national, not international 
accountability mechanisms.197 At the same time, in her statement on the deteriorating situation 
in the CAR, the prosecutor of the ICC referred to the findings of the OHCHR mission to the 
CAR, which seemed „to confirm that crimes that may fall under the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court continue to be committed in CAR, /.../“198. In further action to 
investigate the situation in CAR, besides an OHCHR investigation, initiated by the HRC in 
June 2013, reporting back to the HRC in September 2013 and March 2014, the Security Council 
requested the Secretary-General to launch its own commission of inquiry on CAR in December 
2013199. Without explicitly referring to either investigation, in February 2014, the prosecutor 
of the ICC decided to open a preliminary examination on the situation in the CAR since 
September 2012200. 
It is, thus, possible that the factual information gathered by the investigation serves as the basis 
for subsequent proceedings, including criminal prosecutions of individuals. However, 
notwithstanding the role of the HRC to follow up on cases where it has ordered an investigation, 
it is not always possible to establish whether any future investigation or tribunal has been 
effectuated due to or with the influence of an HRC investigation and HRC action on it. 
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2.4.4 Follow-up by states 
There is little expectation to see action by states on recommendations by HRC investigations, 
least in cases where these had not been supported by the state under investigation. Further, as 
Alston has marked, it is not possible to establish a causal link between the actions of the state 
and the work of investigators „even when human rights improvements on the ground can be 
shown“201. In instances, governments would acknowledge such a link, but mostly convey that 
changes were „internally driven and unrelated to external pressures.“202  
In the 2010 HCHR report on Honduras, commissioned by the HRC in 2009 following a coup 
d’état, more general recommendations were issued to the authorities on the improvement of the 
human rights situation and addressing structural problems203. The same year the government 
requested closer engagement with the OHCHR and in 2010 a senior Human Rights Adviser 
was deployed to Honduras, assisting the government with issues covered in the 
recommendations204. Although this development is not directly attributable to the investigation, 
its positive influence may not be ruled out.    
In some further cases special domestic accountability mechanisms have been established to 
address violations that have been investigated by international missions. According to the UN 
declaration, the sending of a UN fact-finding mission is without prejudice to the use by the 
states of inquiry or any similar procedure or of any means of peaceful settlement of disputes 
agreed by them205. Today, this would apply also to non-international conflicts where 
simultaneous international and domestic investigations are commonplace. 
For example, at the initial request by Cambodian authorities a Group of Experts was appointed 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate how to best respond to past 
serious violations in Cambodia. The experts recommended to the UN to establish an ad hoc 
international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge officials for crimes206. However, after five years of 
negotiations, the UN reached an agreement with the Cambodian government to establish a 
hybrid tribunal, the Extraordinary Cambers in the Courts of Cambodia, consisting of both 
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Cambodian and international judges207. However, no such investigations have directly followed 
from HRC investigations. 
In the case of the DPRK, no action by the country in terms of recommendations by the CoI on 
the DPRK has been noticed, as the country has rejected all allegations in the report of the 
investigation208. Nevertheless, in October 2014 the DPRK had its very first meeting with the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, a special procedure 
established in 2004. The current mandate-holder was also one of the three members of the 
DPRK CoI. The DPRK also invited the special rapporteur to undertake a visit to the DPRK on 
„condition that two operative paragraphs -on accountability of the Supreme Leader and possible 
referral to the International Criminal Court- contained in the draft EU-led resolution on the 
situation of human rights situation in DPRK be removed“209. Thus, as of yet no shift in opinion 
on issues of accountability may be traced. 
 
2.4.5 Prosecutions by third states 
With regard to reports being used in domestic investigations, according to an investigative 
practitioner police, prosecutors and judges rarely use fact-finding reports as key evidence in 
international criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, they may be useful sources, and often a 
starting point, in international criminal investigation210.  
Furthermore, although recommendations are made to states to investigate violations and abuses 
through their respective adjudication mechanisms, recommendations have also been made now 
by the HRC investigations to third states to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes.  
This mechanism is different from the situation of foreign fighters, where domestic 
investigations of states have been triggered vis-à-vis their citizens. In such a case the CoI on 
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Syria confessed to have shared information, upon consent of the source, with justice systems of 
states that were willing to exercise their national jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria211. 
In this case, as discussed above under subsection 3.4.2, in its latest report the CoI on Syria 
turned to possibilities to achieve justice other than through referral to the ICC which is in an 
unyielding position in the Security Council. In its report the CoI on Syria recommended to the 
international community to investigate and prosecute persons and groups implicated in 
violations under their national law according to the principle of universal jurisdiction212. It 
further noted that some states had already indicated willingness to apply universal jurisdiction 
in order to pursue criminal investigations against alleged perpetrators. The CoI asserted that in 
case a state was to gain custody over such a person, and their courts met international fair trial 
standards, the CoI would „be willing to share its information upon request“213. A previous 
similar recommendation concerning enforcing universal jurisdiction has been made by the 
Secretary-General’s CoI on Darfur214.  
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3 The role of the Human Rights Council investigations 
While the previous chapter revealed many important insights into the expectations of the HRC 
in assigning investigations, the activities of the mandate-holders during and the activities of the 
HRC after the investigations, it also raised further questions as to the role of the investigations. 
This chapter seeks to analyse the aspects affecting the possible role of the investigations in 
international law at the backdrop of the evolving legal framework on accountability.   
 
3.1 Constraints of the United Nations 
The lack of legal framework for the fact-finding investigations discovered in the first chapter 
proved to significantly affect the work of the investigations, as analysed in the second chapter. 
It also became clear that the follow-up to the work of the investigations was affected not only 
by the immediate actions taken by the HRC as the mandating body, but also by the other UN 
organs. A further analysis is warranted on the aspects that impact the way that the investigations 
are able to promote accountability. First, I look into the criticism that the investigations are 
facing when conducting their daily activities under the HRC mandates. 
 
3.1.1 Vulnerabilities of the Human Rights Council investigative bodies 
In principle, country investigations should „strive for independence, show restraint, moderation 
and discretion so as not to undermine the recognition of the independent nature of their mandate 
or the environment necessary to properly discharge the said mandate“215. These are conditions 
not only of internal credibility but also of the externalisation of trust that has not always been 
present in the HRC investigations, and that has been scrutinised by the unassured international 
audiences.  
It is possible to notice that the attacks on investigation reports on accountability, including by 
states under review, become more robust as the former may now lead to the prosecution of the 
states’ political and military leadership216. The existence of the will of the states to engage with 
the investigations may be further connected to the more judicial character of the investigations 
that has emerged as witnessed in subsection 2.2.2 of the thesis.   
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Criticism of the investigative bodies has been made regarding both, issues of staffing and the 
conduct of investigations. The principle of ensuring of the impartiality and objectivity of fact-
finders applies also on the selection procedure217.  
As to the composition of the staff, in practice it is the President of the HRC who appoints its 
members218. Although rarely mentioned in the HRC resolution mandating the creation of the 
investigative body, according to practice the CoI or FFM usually comprises three persons, in 
reality accompanied by additional OHCHR staff.  
Since the beginning of the investigations there have been issues raised as to the process of 
appointment of members of investigations. Much of the criticism on the composition of 
investigative bodies includes „ad hominem“ arguments. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the 
accusations regarding the bias of HRC investigations originate from Israel who holds distinct 
status in the HRC as the only country being treated as a separate HRC agenda item. Most 
recently, the international criminal law specialist, Professor William Schabas resigned from the 
latest CoI addressing Israel’s actions during its Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 
2014. Israel had complained regarding Schabas having delivered a legal opinion to the PLO on 
international law questions associated with a possible Palestinian application for membership 
in the ICC two years prior to his appointment. Schabas resigned as the complaint was being 
sent to the UN Office of Legal Affairs for assessment219. Similar allegations of bias had also 
followed Richard Falk as the Special Rapporteur for the OPT during 2008-2014, in his own 
words, „defamatory attacks /.../ that avoids the message while mounting a furious attack on the 
messenger“220.  
As a means to avoid situations of „biased“ members in the investigations, Schabas has proposed 
to adopt UN guidelines on the criteria for disqualification of members of investigations221. 
However, the feasibility of compiling an exhaustive list of criteria remains questionable. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the fact-finders should have the necessary expertise to fulfil the 
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investigation’s mandate222, and that  persons conducting investigations should be, and be 
perceived as, „free of commitment to a preconceived outcome“223.  
The HRC has also been targeted regarding the credibility of the reports. In an exceptional case 
discrediting feedback came from a member of an inquiry himself who withdrew his sponsorship 
of some of the findings of the investigation, while other members stood by the initial report. 
Namely, two years past the publication of the initial report Richard Goldstone claimed that the 
report of the CoI on Israel/Gaza that he had chaired would have possibly been different had he 
known some information previously224. He went on to assert that the „allegations of 
intentionality by Israel were based on the deaths of and injuries to civilians in situations where 
our fact-finding mission had no evidence on which to draw any other reasonable conclusion.“ 
Relying on investigations published by Israeli military, which indicated that civilians were not 
intentionally targeted as a matter of policy, he basically retracted from the findings of the CoI 
which noted that there had been „a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, 
humiliate and terrorize a civilian population“ by Israel225. 
Criticism of selectivity is often used with regard to activities of the HRC, which may also be 
called as  the „sins of omission“ or „sins of commission“, as described by Chomsky 226. 
Regarding the integrity of the conduct of investigations, as with issues on persons, the criticism 
mostly originates from the countries under investigation. In the case of Sri Lanka, the 
government accused the conduct of the investigation as being unprofessional and the approach 
of the investigation selective and biased. The HCHR defended the investigation by reassuring 
that the UN investigators were trained to spot fraudulent submissions, and that the methodology 
of the investigation is made public through its terms of reference, being „based on standard 
methodology /.../ aimed at ensuring the integrity of the process through the application of the 
principles of independence, impartiality, objectivity and protection of witnesses. 227” The 
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considerations for substantive and methodological integrity have been seen as crucial for fact-
finding, at least in literature generally sympathetic to the role of the investigations228. At the 
same time, the methodology remains vulnerable to criticism. As seen in the thesis previously, 
the content of the methodology varies from investigation to investigation. Some voices have 
been calling for more flexibility on evidentiary criteria for the human rights fact-finders than 
applicable to international judicial bodies, due to the „different context“ from the former229. 
Furthermore, the rather ad hoc methodology has been seen as a necessary precondition or „evil“ 
of flexibility conducive to effective fact-finding230. 
While the discourse of foul conduct by investigations is pervasively used by countries that do 
not cooperate with the HRC investigations, similar observations also extend to legal 
scholarship231. Notwithstanding clear cases of misconduct, the bias argument remains a 
convenient and oft-used stick with which to beat the HRC investigations, a method of defence 
for states to attack the report rather than accept responsibility232. To overcome criticism, a 
„more judicial approach“ for fact-finding has been put forward. A need has been voiced for the 
„gradual professionalization of fact-finding“, relating to training, methodology and 
standards233. Ramcharan has further suggested that the HRC should have rules on how the 
investigative bodies are created and how the reports are being handled234. 
Although it is important to separate the credibility of the investigation in a narrow sense from 
the credibility of the actions of the HRC, the latter inevitably casts a shadow on the former. 
Many authors deem the HRC to be a „highly political“ body basically continuing the legacy of 
the Commission on Human Rights235. However, this view may be considered over simplistic 
and not contributing much to the discussion. While the HRC is seen as divided on politically 
sensitive issues, ongoing tensions have affected the actions of the HRC on certain human rights 
issues, which Freedman has attributed to the North-South divide, illustrated by regionalism and 
group tactics236. She has criticised the HRC Special sessions, during which also many of the 
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investigations have been created of the familiar notions of bias and selectivity, concentrating 
on Israel resulting in less attention being paid to other regional human rights violations and 
crisis237. 
Freedman, however, found that the HRC has fulfilled its role in relation to fact-finding238. She 
saw an obstacle in the possibility of states to block the HRC in fulfilling this function by 
refusing to cooperate with mandate-holders. This, however, should not be considered an actual 
hindrance, as was shown in subsection 2.3.1, whereby the investigations are carried on 
regardless of non-cooperation.  
A further point was made, also apparent from the subsections on follow-up above, that without 
binding powers from the resolution creating the HRC, there is not much more that the HRC 
may do to implement recommendations other than follow-up and referral of situations to the 
UNGA or the Security Council, and the use by the HRC of diplomatic pressure, among other 
means, to discharge its mandate.239  
With this in mind, I will proceed to consider the important aspects related to the effectuation of 
the investigations throughout the UN system. 
 
3.1.2 An omnipresence at the United Nations 
It is clear that the Security Council is the body of the UN able to ensure compliance with human 
rights obligations. As such, it is the link between HRC and the Security Council which should 
ensure the adequate use of the recommendations of the investigations. As witnessed in the 
second chapter of the thesis, practice for such an effective outcome is lacking. 
Due to issues connected to the political body of the Security Council with veto powers, it may 
seem even inevitable that the UN system of follow-up does not produce meaningful outcome 
to the investigations, at least most of the time. 
The Security Council has been shown, at least rhetorically, to consider issues of individual 
accountability integrally linked with international peace and security. It has also taken 
increasing steps to uphold individual accountability through the establishment of ad hoc 
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criminal tribunals, referrals to the ICC, and imposing individual sanctions on perpetrators of 
human rights violations240. UN investigations have been used by the Security Council since 
1993. However, its practice has been found to be ambiguous, as also examined in the previous 
chapter of the thesis regarding the action of the Security Council in cases referred to it which 
had been investigated by the HRC mandate, and further found to be even contradictory241. 
Inconsistencies include with regard to referrals to the ICC242, following up on its previous 
decisions regarding individual accountability, and having a short attention span in such cases 
in general. As a political body the Security Council has been seen to „opt for ignoring 
accountability in favour of short-term political conciliation, short-term cessation of violence or 
cutting back on expenses. Or, it may simply take no action at all /.../.“243 As such, the Security 
Council may be considered to approach accountability from the perspective of political interest 
rather than any principled views244. 
 
3.1.3 The „political“ of human rights 
In the light of the above, the question remains, why the HRC is used for investigations purposes, 
if it seems not to produce desirable results? This topic is linked to larger issues of the capabilities 
and innate obstacles to the activities of the international organisations, whereby states are 
generally reluctant to grant autonomy to international organisations with legally binding 
abilities. 
This conundrum has been described with regard to the HRC treaty body reform as a tension 
between „a superficial commitment by many state-parties to the goal of human rights promotion 
and a realpolitik aversion to actual treaty implementation“245. 
The rejection of either the process or the outcome of the investigations attests to issues of state 
sovereignty and consent to adjudication that is lacking in the HRC process, discussed in 
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subsection 2.3.1, to which some states are having a difficulties adjusting. The discourse of the 
possible role of the international human rights fact-finding investigations is, thus, connected to 
a wider discussion of the application of international human rights law. 
Indeed, one of the possibilities to look at the seeming hardship to reach decisions on the 
effectuation of the recommendations of the investigations is illustrated by the discourse of the 
innate obstructions in the applicability of international human rights law.  
In this regard, for example, Posner is pessimistic, arguing that there is little evidence that human 
rights treaties have improved the well-being of people or resulted in the adherence to the rights 
enshrined in the UN treaty system and beyond. After examining the compliance of states with 
human rights law and its influences, he concluded that it does not have much actual impact246. 
With this Posner noted one of the very issues that the HRC investigations are struggling with. 
Namely, the setting up of committees monitoring compliance with human rights which lack an 
enforcement mechanism, an authority to order states to comply247. One may further argue that 
similarly to the HRC treaty body reports the investigation reports may be considered a form of 
soft coersion. According to one view the „so-called „CNN effect“ has never pushed a 
democratic government to do something it did not want to do"248. Such arguments are not easily 
dismissed. Even though the examination of the cases of HRC investigations showed some 
progress in the activities of the ground, the linkage remained inconclusive. 
Posner further argues that while states have agreed to enter into human rights treaties, they have 
been reluctant to submit themselves under the jurisdiction of courts or other legal entities, 
inevitably leaving the legal institutions of the international fora weaker than in the domestic 
sphere249. The original task of the human rights treaties having a judicial oversight never 
realised. As seen in the second chapter of the thesis, the results of the investigations rather tend 
to be pushed in the direction and towards the discretion of the Security Council.  
Thus, Posner sees one of the failures of international human rights law in the lacking of a 
binding international adjudication mechanism, and the lack of possibilities to bring about 
change on the domestic level. Again, he argues that the UN human rights bodies, the HRC, 
OHCHR and treaty bodies interpret human rights but do not possess the power to force 
implementation. States are further aware of the possibility of these bodies advancing 
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interpretations of law that countries do not accept250. The aforementioned would support a 
somewhat cynical view, according to which the HRC investigations are tolerated as no 
operational results are expected from them. States remain in control of the mechanism and no 
„costs“ arise from establishing fact-finding investigations. 
Nevertheless, by claiming that the human rights bodies cannot compel states to adopt their 
interpretations or adhere to them, Posner dismisses the ultimate possibilities of the UN system 
when it comes to grave violations of human rights, notably by the Security Council. In a way, 
the mechanism of the HRC investigations has been used, knowingly or unknowingly, to 
circumvent the „regular“ or „traditional“ unenforceability of human rights, by trying to prove 
violations, admittedly mostly of the grave kind, and enforce the opinion of the need for 
accountability via the UN system, notably the Security Council. 
In the light of the scepticism of the investigations and the possible inherent impotence of the 
United Nations system to put into effect the recommendations of the investigations revealed 
above, the question then arises whether indeed too much is expected from the HRC fact-finding. 
In the final subsections of the thesis I will look into the possible roles of the investigations to 
be used to promote accountability, not necessarily only relying on its effectuation by the HRC. 
In order to proceed to this an exploration of the evolving framework of international law relating 
to accountability is needed. 
 
3.2 The evolving framework of international law on accountability 
 
3.2.1 The indispensable sovereign will 
According to one possible view the system of state sovereignty has been considerably eroded 
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whereby individuals were 
confirmed to possess rights under international law and, thus, entitled to legal protection from 
violations by their governments. Whilst the idea of individual rights did not become a reality 
until a few decades after the UDHR, this has been referred to as the beginning of the modern 
era of human rights251. However, only much later the ICTY and the ICTR tribunals have revived 
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the idea of Nuremberg trials of individuals committing international crimes by engaging in 
human rights violations amounting to the level of atrocity252. 
The international community is generally seen as not having had very a good track record of 
protecting people from mass atrocities, mainly due to the privileging of the rights of states over 
the rights of people and issues associated with political will253. Even more so, „none of these 
obstacles can be wished away“254. Utopian proposals have been made, for example, for an 
institutional structure to deal with mass atrocities in a context of an intra-state humanitarian 
crisis in the form of a body of twelve judges elected by the whole of the UN with the capacity 
to dispatch independent fact-finding missions. Such a body’s findings and the appropriate 
response, if containing coercive measures, would be envisioned as grounds for individual 
countries to act, even if the Security Council refused to act255. If not for the certainty that states 
would never create a body with such powers, the system would still entail political decisions 
by states to act or refrain from acting in any concrete case. 
 
3.2.2 The principle of responsibility to protect 
The principle of the responsibility to protect, the third pillar of which lately emerged in the case 
of Libya, is linked to the effort to fight impunity and protect populations, including from the 
actions or omissions by their governments.  
As is often the case with the reports by the HRC investigations which show blatant violations 
of international law, including human rights law, it is rarely felt by states, at least in rhetoric, 
that there should be no action and no accountability. The principle of R2P may be seen as 
promoting the legitimisation of the states’ commitment, or desire, to take action in case of 
violations. Nevertheless, as its third pillar operates through the Security Council, the R2P 
mechanism in end is still confronted with the previously discussed inconsistency of political 
will. 
Furthermore, although states have been reluctant to enforce the principle of responsibility to 
protect, Bellamy has argued that the inclusion of the element of the sovereign or political will 
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is both indispensable for the existence and the possible application of the R2P principle256. In 
terms of fighting against impunity, traditionally the governments have been called upon to 
ensure access to justice for all and to refrain from using national security, immunities or any 
other measures to “cloak criminal behaviour.”257 Under the R2P principle the same could be 
said to apply to the UN who has been called to take a more decisive role in combating impunity 
and to „focus on all dimensions of the problem“, including the erosion of the rule of law and 
the violation of general principles of justice.”258 
 
3.2.3 The justice cascade 
Sikkink has provided a wider perspective to the emergence of the norm (although the aspect of 
the legal implications are still a topic of debate for states) of individual criminal responsibility 
in the international legal arena through an expression from the sociological phenomenon of a 
cascade, or, in this case - a justice cascade; the gradual emergence of a norm through efforts of 
various actors259. In her work she describes and gives credit to the movement that brought 
forward, embedded in law, and put into practice the ideas of individual criminal responsibility. 
In her narrative Sikkink largely bases the origins of this cascade, its „first streams“ on the fight 
against immunity perceived to belong to powerful leaders who abused their status and 
wrongfully treated the citizens of the country. In this sense, the HRC investigations may be 
viewed as providing yet another stream into the general framework of pursuing individual 
accountability that started with the indictments of heads of states, which remains topical to this 
day. 
Sikkink went on to claim that although the ICC plays a role, it is not the main institution through 
which the new model of individual accountability is enforced, due to its complementary role, 
and rather gives the credit for the enforcement to the domestic courts260. Similarly, the field of 
international criminal justice has been further altered by the emergence of third party 
prosecutions under the aegis of universal jurisdiction. Rare until the mid-1990s, the practice has 
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increased, although not always having reached the verdict stage261. The same was also observed 
previously under subsection 2.4.5 of the thesis. 
Bosco has also granted viability to the constructivist „norm cascade“ in international justice. In 
relation to the ICC he feels that the free flow of impartial international justice still suffers from 
obstacles, citing major-power control mechanisms262. As also marked in the previous section 
of the thesis, for Bosco, the central element here remains the interaction between the Security 
Council and the Court263. 
Some authors have proposed an obvious gap in the process of pursuing justice, namely that 
establishing individual responsibility must be accompanied by state responsibility in the 
colloquial sense of the term, or the collective will to pursue justice. Such state responsibility 
flows from various, including moral, political and legal considerations 264. 
Further, the individual accountability framework has been labelled more reminiscent of 
patchwork than a coherent regime, international law having just partially recognised individual 
responsibility, including by states holding persons accountable „sporadically and often with 
reluctance“265. The issue of selectivity means that there are differences in the feasibility of 
prosecuting the only few alleged perpetrators of crimes, and prosecuting a larger number of 
persons, meaning that in the latter case the „full accountability“ becomes more complex, and 
may not always even be desirable266. This means more nuanced accountability for large-scale 
violations.  
As for the HRC, there is an obvious link between the investigations mandated by it and the 
principle of the responsibility to protect. The HRC fact-finding investigations are also important 
from the perspective of the evolving framework of the UN’s approach to both the rule of law267 
and the principle of R2P as the entity providing first-hand information of ongoing violations. 
At the same time, the unlimited powers of the Security Council to address individuals’ criminal 
responsibility, including by setting up ad hoc tribunals and referring cases to ICC may have a 
detrimental effect on international criminal law due to possible attainment of different goals, 
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i.e politisation268. Concerning the impact of fact-finding converging with international criminal 
law on states, Alston  has predicted that there will be even further rejection by governments of 
reports with implications on criminal behaviour which is considered as „something that needs 
to be discredited at all costs“269. However, he also finds that the infusion of criminal prosecution 
into fact-finding processes is important as it adds new perspective and gives teeth to fact-finding 
practices270. 
According to another positive outlook, the R2P principle may become a self-fulfilling prophecy 
or a further addition the justice cascade. Namely, on the premises that as the UN and especially 
the Security Council become more proactive, the demands for accountability become more 
persistent271. The same may be said to be happening in the case of the HRC, whereby it has 
taken investigative action, whereas in similar cases it previously had not done so. This may well 
be because of the perceived role that the HRC, or, more accurately, the states comprising the 
HRC, have taken upon themselves to address violations by sending stronger signals, least in 
rhetoric, on accountability. 
 
3.2.4 Universal jurisdiction 
It has been proposed that responsibility in conflicts is not a question of choice, but, in every 
sense, a more positive question of the existence of an obligation to prosecute under international 
law272. Universal jurisdiction, as meaning the competence of a state through its domestic courts 
to try persons accused of crimes under international law, which have no connection to the said 
state, i.e regardless of the place of the commission of the crime, the nationality of the person 
allegedly committing the crimes nor the victim. In this connection it is important to note that, 
as mentioned above, the universal jurisdiction and the right to prosecute by third states is, 
pursuant to some international treaties, an obligation of states273. However, not all international 
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law violations fall in the scope of application of universal jurisdiction, only the „gravest“ 
violations, traditionally such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes.  
According to examination in subsection 2.4.5 of the thesis there has been some interest from 
states to pursue prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction. The use of the instrument is, 
nevertheless, without controversies and has gained opposition, including being labelled as 
oppression by European judges against Africans.274 On the same subject, calls have been made 
to create a general and unified practice as a basis for recognition of universal jurisdiction as a 
generally binding rule under customary international law275. 
As viewed in the beginning of the thesis international law has evolved in the direction of, if not 
regulating, then allowing the existence of fact-finding investigations, albeit with some 
resistance. What is more, as revealed in this section, the international law has evolved in a 
manner conducive to the HRC investigations to promote accountability; albeit with constraints. 
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, and now bearing in mind the international law 
framework, in the below final subsections I will look into the further possible roles of the HRC 
investigations to be used to promote accountability, regardless of the effectuation of its 
recommendations by the HRC. 
 
3.3 Accountability beyond the Human Rights Council 
As is clear by now, fact-finding is not an accountability mechanism in itself, but it promotes 
accountability. Most scholarship does not deny the non-judicial nature of fact-finding. 
Considering that the investigative bodies are not courts, they can „only“ point out different 
options to reach accountability, or as per instructions of the mandate. As dealt with in previous 
parts of the thesis, one of the preconditions for a credible investigation is that its results must 
match the standard of proof. 
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3.3.1 The framework to enhance accountability through investigations 
Accountability may come in the form of legal or political accountability with criminal, civil or 
administrative consequences, and every violation of international law by a state gives rise to a 
form of accountability.276 The examination in the previous subsection attested to the rise of UN 
rhetoric and action on the fight against impunity of and accountability for individuals who had 
perpetrated crimes under international law.  
It is noteworthy that the policy paper for states on the promotion accountability through the 
human rights bodies in Geneva does not address the HRC ad hoc investigations as one of the 
means to promote accountability.277 Notwithstanding this, one may say that at the backdrop of 
the evolution of international law it is not possible to mandate an investigation on human rights 
violations and rule out individual criminal responsibility. 
According to a general understanding, people must have access to mechanisms that uphold their 
human rights if national courts fail to do so. As emerged from the empirical part of the thesis, 
the HRC has, in most instances, mandated the investigations to identify violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law and the perpetrators of the violations. As the investigations possess 
non-judicial capacities, albeit sometimes surpassing these by making decisions of a more 
judicial character, the investigations clearly do not project the same legal implications as a 
conviction in international criminal proceedings278. Thus, the investigations may be seen as 
assuming the role of promoting accountability. 
It was further apparent from examining in chapter two of the thesis that in most cases 
investigations were called to find the perpetrators of the crimes. This implies persons rather 
than states as perpetrators, which is also supported by the fact that many investigations drew up 
lists of names, confidential or not, of persons who allegedly violated rights. Thus, the 
investigations are, in this sense, focussed on individual liability.  
A decision by the UN to establish an entity to assess individual criminal liability was first made 
by the Security Council when establishing the ICTY. For some, this power is seen to challenge 
the separation between establishment of state responsibility and individual criminal liability279.  
                                                 
276 TRIAL and the International Commission of Jurists. Promoting Accountability through the Human Rights 
Bodies in Geneva. A Working Paper for States. 2013, at 11. 
277 Ibid. 
278 See also: Talsma. Op. cit. note 63, at 422. 
279 Bonafè. Op. cit. note 268, at 203. 
56 
 
Still, for some time already the Security Council has been dealing with resolutions on conduct 
of individuals and resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with measures directed at 
individuals. Thus, this broad interpretation of the powers of the Security Council seems to be 
accepted, as long as it is aimed at maintaining international peace and security. As discussed in 
the previous subsection, this attests to the move of international law towards addressing 
individual responsibility, and to the Security Council’s powers to address the conduct of 
individuals. In this connection, concerns have been expressed that this course of action may 
sideline the responsibility, for their part, of states or even substitute it280. 
Fact-finding bodies may also be used in establishing tribunals for accountability. Returning to 
the ICTY case, it is undoubted that the creation of the tribunal contributed to the establishment 
of accountability for the atrocity crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. However, it may 
be contested what exactly the role of the original investigation by the Commission of Experts 
was leading to the creation of the ICTY. Namely, the Security Council had already issued many 
resolutions on the situation in the former Yugoslavia prior to the establishment of the 
investigation. The Security Council reacted to the establishment of the tribunal already at the 
time of the „interim report“ of the commission281. Questions arise, whether this was a highly 
timely response by the Security Council to the interim report or a way to legitimise a plan of 
action by states in the Security Council, even if this was due to external pressures, that could 
have been proceeded with without the investigation. Somewhat in this connection, the role of 
an investigation as a tool of the „political“ was treated under the previous section of the thesis. 
Further on a more theoretical note so far, in addressing the issue of whether human rights 
monitoring staff should be obliged to testify in international courts, Robertson has pointed out 
that any human rights monitor is competent to give evidence, except for employees or former 
employees of the Red Cross, due to the special position under the Geneva Conventions; a view 
that has been upheld by the ICTY282. However, in order to protect the perceived neutrality in 
case of war correspondence, according to case-law the calls for was correspondents to testify 
have been limited to cases where the testimonies would be „really significant“283. The same 
principle could be applied by way of analogy to UN investigators. The privilege of 
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correspondents to withhold the names of their sources would be retained284. The same principle 
has been later applied to a UN staff member, who was permitted to not undergo cross-
examination nor name his sources due to fear of reprisals against the source285. A public interest 
also exists in giving assurances of confidentiality to former and future witnesses who tell their 
stories. 
Clearly the effect that the investigation bears on the realm of international law also depends on 
its outcome, including the degree at which it corresponded to the standard of proof, that is 
whether it was able to make firm findings on facts, forming a view on a balance of probabilities, 
or was unable to reach a definite conclusion. In this connection, a fact-finding body has been 
considered freer in its formulation of the outcome of its work, whereas a court or a tribunal, in 
considering the evidence needs to make clear decisions on the applicability of the outcome of 
the investigation286. 
Albeit so far more in theory, as shown in the second chapter of the thesis, the work of the 
investigations may provide crucial elements to judicial procedures: ad hoc tribunals and the 
ICC, and may trigger transitional justice mechanisms287. Another view places little burden on 
the investigations, as in situations where governments deny or hide gross violations of human 
rights and „band together to avoid international scrutiny“, recording and publicising gross 
violations being committed may be „the most that can be done in the quest for justice“288.  
The enhancement of criminal justice takes place through interoperability of different 
mechanisms – either justice mechanisms or others leading to justice. Linkages of HRC 
investigations with other simultaneous accountability efforts was considered in the empirical 
analysis, where it was found that the HRC has not been proactive in inserting more specific 
instructions of cooperation with other accountability mechanisms in the mandates. 
There have been voices calling for the gulf between the work of fact-finders and the work of 
criminal prosecutions to be bridged289. I will next look into possibilities of the HRC 
investigations to contribute to the investigations of the ICC and truth commissions. 
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3.3.2 Cooperation with the ICC 
As previously examined in the thesis, none of the calls of the HRC investigations for referral 
of a case to the ICC has so far materialised. There have been simultaneous efforts by both 
entities to investigate cases, which nevertheless does not allow to conclude that the 
investigations were overlapping. 
Cooperation between the UN and the ICC is regulated by a Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement290, the wording of which is very general, only specifying the exchange of 
information between the organisations. Allegedly the OHCHR and the ICC have begun a 
dialogue about evidentiary collaboration that might ultimately entail joint training of ICC and 
OHCHR investigators.291 
The 2013 report on cooperation between the ICC and the UN described that the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC had been in contact with international commissions of inquiry set up by 
the UN Secretary-General, the Security Council and the HRC, including regarding the situations 
in Darfur, Guinea and Libya.292 It went on to confirm that the investigations may provide 
valuable source of information on allegations on possible commission of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, especially beneficial during preliminary examinations by the OTP293. 
ICC claimed to be most interested in information on possible crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, such as information on the most serious crimes, any preliminary indication of 
perpetrators or groups alleged to be responsible, an assessment of the legal qualification of the 
alleged acts, and any information on the existence and quality of national proceedings in 
relation to such crimes.294  
With reference to the growing number of investigations of violations of international law, 
including international criminal law called for by the HRC, a pattern may inevitably be evolving 
whereby the reports of the HRC investigations are turning into a kind of a criminal law test to 
establish whether or not violations amount to those prosecuted by the ICC or not. Still, this 
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order of things would produce uneven results due to the possibilities of various interpretation 
of the HRC mandate, qualification of violations by the investigation and so on. 
On another account, the HRC investigations may produce added value to ICC’s own 
investigations, as criminal investigators are rarely the first actors arriving at the scene of 
massive human rights violations295. Admittedly, NGOs and the media are usually more quickly 
placed in conflict zones than UN entities. Most authors see the added contribution of the HRC 
investigations in the form of preliminary information on which to build an actual ICC 
investigation; as an indicator of violations. Frigaard concluded that the information gathered by 
the fact-finders was most useful as a starting point for the investigation and not as investigating 
material as such.296 This may be seen as part of the developments whereby fact-finding in 
general, and HRC fact-finding in particular is seen as something „more“ than its mandate in the 
strict sense, including by contributing to international criminal law. 
As noted by the CoI’s themselves in reports, the HRC investigative bodies are „not expected to 
seek evidence of a standard to support a criminal conviction", but rather to gather “a reliable 
body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a person 
may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime“.297 
However, regardless of their similarities, human rights investigations differ from criminal 
investigations. The HCHR has enumerated the differences as follows: the human rights 
inquiries „may pursue a lesser burden of proof“, stop at prima facie evidence, and that the 
investigations, mostly, do not lead to the identification of individual perpetrators298. In this 
respect, however, the HRC investigation cases show a trend of increasing calls by the HRC to 
identify perpetrators, which may lead the investigators increasingly to do so. The HCHR further 
mentioned as differences the requirement of the human rights investigators to identify 
themselves and openly record evidence. She further noted the possibility or, in reality rather a 
necessity, to pursue investigations under limited temporal conditions299, which is indeed often 
the case. However, the latter might imply that the substance of the human rights investigation’s 
report may not be as comprehensive as it is in criminal investigations, or that it imperatively 
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need not be so in human rights investigations. Although the inquisitorial, instead of the 
adversarial, nature of the ICC proceedings allow for the prosecutor to make thorough 
investigations300, this should not be excluded to the HRC investigations by default. 
In the end, similarly to the discretionary powers of the HRC and ultimately the Security Council 
to act on the results of the investigations, the prosecutor of the ICC holds powers to initiate 
investigations, thus being open to accusations of inconsistency, selectivity and bias301. 
Even if seen as evidence by the HRC investigation, no evidence properly called so, exists 
outside courts, as in international criminal law in general, evidence becomes such only by being 
admitted in court after being subjected to arguments by parties302. At the same time, unlike 
domestic courts with strict rules of evidence, it has been proposed that international criminal 
courts also enjoy „great flexibility“ and should be guided by „general principles of fairness“303. 
However, notwithstanding the lowest common denominator evolved under customary 
international law, this does not exactly apply to the ICC, as it has its own extensive rules of 
procedure and evidence304. In comparison, as the human rights investigations have very few 
procedural standards, this also results in a poor compatibility with the rules of procedure of the 
ICC305. 
Further, a multi-disciplinary approach has been promoted in an ICTY compilation of its 
practices306. It describes the merits of operational teams with staff with various backgrounds. 
ICC senior analyst and legal scholar Aranburu has widened this approach to include actors 
outside of a single institution, advocating for a „multidisciplinary approach“ to enhance 
international criminal investigations as such. Together with the fact-finding missions he gives 
credit to NGO investigative efforts307. Aranburu suggests using among other specialists the field 
the workers of international organisations as witnesses in criminal tribunals308. This could well 
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be the case for members of investigative bodies of the HRC, as discussed in the previous 
subsection on witnesses from UN staff. Still, clearly this should not be the primary 
accomplishment of their work. 
The HRC investigations and the ICC share an issue with regard to a possible hierarchy of human 
rights, where prominence is given to the „grave“ violations. In the case of the ICC, this is more 
apparent due to the clear stipulations of such crimes in the Rome Statute - the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, the crimes against humanity and aggression. In terms of doctrine, 
according to Alston, there has been an adjustment to the theory of indivisibility of human rights, 
i.e the claims that there are no hierarchies of rights. This claim has become less plausible in a 
situation where „a particular set of crimes are singled out for the strongest possible 
treatment“309. As seen above, the mandate of the HRC has mentioned the types of crimes that 
were to be investigated, sometimes to some detail, tilting towards the more grave crimes. One 
may conclude this to arise from practical considerations. Nevertheless, this threatens to leave 
„lesser“ crimes without a clear-cut avenue for justice, at least through the HRC, not to mention 
the ICC.  
 
3.3.3 Accountability – not always through courts  
A great deal of fact-finding, such as in the case of the HRC, is of ad hoc nature, on a one-off 
basis, and tends to serve „a broad range of objectives“310.         
Nowadays, various fora exist for holding perpetrators accountable – national tribunals, 
domestic trials by third states, international criminal tribunals, commissions of inquiry, civil 
action311. And trials are not the only avenue to tackle past crimes and human rights violations 
by states, as akin to truth commissions, also the means of lustration has been put forward as an 
example to deal with a difficult past312.  
Regardless of the scepticism apparent in the use of the recommendations of the investigations 
by the UN, I would not agree with the statement that the factual findings made by the inquiries 
are „likely to be more politically and historically important than judicially influential313“.  
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At the same time, the HRC investigations may be viewed as aiding states in their pursuits for 
transitional justice. The human rights investigations may well possess the subsidiary role to 
„record for history, and perhaps for justice“ the violations that have been conducted314. 
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, some authors have seen „full accountability“ for 
violations of international law as something not worth striving towards, explaining in the first 
instance that accountability is „not the only value“ to pursue, with further referring to situations 
of countries in transition from conflict315. 
In this respect, the main tasks of the HRC investigations regarding criminal law implications, 
namely the identification of the perpetrated crimes and the perpetrators – either meaning states, 
individuals or groups, as was examined in subsection 2.1.2 of the thesis indicate a retributive 
rather than a restorative nature of the HRC investigations316.  
According to a sympathetic view, the HRC investigations have triggered transitional justice 
mechanisms, and have therefore informed more sustainable peacebuilding and reconciliation 
efforts, assisted in the political settlement of conflicts, provided a historical record of serious 
violations, and influenced positive change in law and practice317. While all this may well have 
happened, the analysis of the HRC cases did not allow to conclude on a link of the investigations 
with the national peacebuilding endeavours. Admittedly such impact is also dependent on the 
cooperation of the state.  
The UN Principles against Impunity address the notion of „the right to know“, which includes 
the right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and 
the reasons that led to their perpetration318. The measures to give effect to this right includes 
setting up of truth commissions or other commissions of inquiry to establish the facts 
surrounding the violations, including to preserve evidence319. 
Although these measures seem to be directed at individual states, the investigations of the HRC 
investigations may pursue similar aims. At the same time, these mechanisms may still have 
significant differences, especially concerning that the truth commissions might not always 
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reach the level of objectivity and comprehensiveness requisite in the HRC investigations. 
Namely, according to the principles, the investigations by truth commissions should be 
conducted with the object „in particular of securing recognition of such parts of the truth as 
were formerly denied“, taking as its basis the „recognition of the dignity of victims and their 
families“. The HRC investigations seem to be incompatible with transitional justice 
mechanisms in the sense that the former should, ideally, deal with fact-finding and thus lacks 
the permission to flexibly take into account the societal changes and other factors necessary in 
the case of transitional justice, which might cause losing the credibility of a quasi-judicial entity, 
whose operation has already been challenged by critics as being too flexible. Thus, significant 
shifts in the focus and scope of investigations may occur. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine 
that HRC investigations providing either encouragement to domestic truth processes as a role 
model or providing factual input in the form of the information gathered. 
More generally speaking, the HRC investigations are mandated to investigate violations either 
after they had been committed or while they were being committed. In many cases the HRC 
prescribed the temporal scope of the investigations. This poses the wider question of HRC 
investigations being more of a retributive or restorative nature. I argue that the HRC 
investigations are not primarily for redressing legacies of human rights abuses, but for finding 
factual information on certain violations. The essential value of transitional justice lies in the 
notion of justice, which does not have to mean criminal justice. This latter does not correspond 
to the aim generally and, in particular, lately pursued by the investigations mandated by the 
HRC. 
On a positive note, in the context of the right to truth the commissions have been encouraged 
to safeguard evidence „for later use in the administration of justice“320. This function 
corresponds to that of the HRC investigations as a possibility to help ensure promotion of 
accountability by appropriate adjudication. 
Furthermore, the Security-General has noted in his 2004 report on rule of law that while 
tribunals are important, the UN experience with truth commissions showed them to be a 
potentially valuable complementary tool in the quest for justice and reconciliation, taking the 
victim-centred approach and helping to establish a historical record and recommend remedial 
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action. And further that they remain key to restoring public trust in national institutions of 
governance321. 
And even here we cannot fully escape the looming role of the Security Council, as assisting in 
the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms „has become a regular feature in its 
peacekeeping missions’ mandates“322. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As countries keep blatantly violating human rights and not admitting to wrongdoings, the 
United Nations in general and the Human Rights Council in particular have increasingly 
resorted to investigative bodies to help respond to violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law, and to ensure accountability for these violations. The responses of the 
international community rely on obtaining truthful information of the alleged violations to 
pursue possible further action to protect persons from violations and abuses.  
In order to fight impunity and for victims to gain relief and redress, the investigations should 
complement the existing UN and the international criminal justice systems. In the light of the 
increase in investigations, there has been less action on the outcomes of investigations attesting 
to violations. The thesis aimed to look specifically into the investigations mandated by the UN 
HRC to find out the role of the investigations in responding to violations and try to determine 
if the actions of the HRC in commissioning and following up on the investigations are 
conducive to obtaining justice or rather act as a „fig leaf“for substantive HRC inaction. 
In the first section I outlined the basis for UN investigation from which HRC investigations 
form a part. The first look into the human rights fact-finding activity as such revealed that the 
UN was not built with fact-finding in mind. This was still an era when states resolved disputes 
between themselves under international law, deriving from the Hague Conventions, at best. The 
implications in the UN Charter allowing the UN bodies to deal with fact-finding are rather 
general in their wording. The same follows from examining the documents establishing the 
HRC. Still, the Secretary-General, the UNGA and the then Commission on Human Rights 
commenced its practice of investigations from the 1960’s, whereas today the bulk of the 
mandates are initiated by the HRC on its own. 
Further to the founders of UN not foreseeing fact-finding as a concrete means for securing 
peace, security and protection of human rights, it became clear from looking at its definitions 
and purposes that to this day the phenomenon of fact-finding has failed to generate a common 
understanding. However, it has changed substantively from the version found in the Hague 
Conventions, not requiring a situation of a dispute between states or the consent of the state for 
the initiation of an investigation. Due to its ad hoc nature, the UN fact-finding has only recently 
induced a body of codified methodology to guide its work, which, nevertheless, remains general 
and not binding. 
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As all common understanding on the investigations is based on individual ad hoc fact-finding 
instances, I proceeded to examine the practice of the HRC of around 20 cases that have 
accumulated so far. First, I looked into the mandates of the HRC in order to find out what the 
investigations had been tasked with. It became clear that on many occasions the mandates were 
vague and the HRC did not give clear instructions to the investigators on what it wanted them 
to do. At the same time, in some cases the HRC had become very specific in its demands, 
ordering the investigative body to identifying crimes and their perpetrators with a view to 
avoiding impunity and holding accountable those responsible. Thus, an emergence of a clear 
link between human rights fact-finding and ensuring accountability may be noticed. Tasking 
investigations to ascertain perpetrators may be considered a considerable shift in modern UN 
fact-finding work. This undoubtedly raises several questions, including regarding the legal 
nature of such findings and their implications on the procedural rights of the alleged 
perpetrators. These issues remain to be thoroughly discussed by the UN and in academic 
literature. 
The HRC has mandated several investigations on Israel, which remain as a separate agenda 
point of the HRC, inherited from its predecessor the Commission on Human Rights. The 
investigations on Israel have received attention due to their amount and the one-sided approach, 
and are an easy target to discredit these fact-finding activities by arguing the selectiveness of 
the HRC.  
In further other cases, the HRC had used non-state entities as subjects for investigation, 
including ISIL and Boko Haram. Although the resolutions in these cases mentioned state 
responsibility as primary for the protection of human rights, they failed to include states as the 
subjects of the investigations. 
As in many cases the HRC left ample room for the investigative bodies to conduct their work, 
my review of the interpretation of the mandates by the investigators revealed further 
inconsistencies. In many cases the investigators had either expanded or specified their mandate. 
I discovered that oftentimes the investigation could not cover the mandate either in geographical 
terms or in terms of substance, due to lack of access to territory, or for reasons of limited 
resources, especially time-wise.  
In most cases the investigations did not endeavour to present mere facts but went to lengths to 
produce analysis and deduction, not always mandated by the HRC. Thus, the investigators 
assumed a more judicial role. The investigations also assigned qualifications to either crimes 
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committed or the perpetrators. In the case of Israel also the conduct of other parties to the 
conflict was discussed. 
I further examined the possible obstacles to fulfilling the mandates of the investigations. 
Cooperation with the state under investigation did not seem to matter in terms of conduct of the 
investigation or the credibility of the report, albeit making it more difficult to obtain first-hand 
information. These more lenient sentiments seem to have emerged, in part, due to the frustrating 
circumstances of repeated non-cooperation of the state.  
Human rights investigations surely raise great expectations. Therefore, I next turned my 
attention to the steps that the HRC had taken to enhance the implementation of the 
recommendations by investigations, or: how the report had been utilised to remedy the human 
rights violations. In some cases, follow-up had been actually effectuated and had brought along 
concrete actions, as in the case of Lebanon. In some other cases, the investigations had been 
piled up on previous investigations, showing no visible effect as to enhancement of protection 
of rights on the ground. In conclusion, it appeared that there is often no lack of follow-up by 
the HRC but of follow-up that would yield any actual results. There have been some steps 
towards implementing the recommendations of the investigations on accountability, including, 
somewhat surprisingly, in the case of the DPRK, albeit this was for a further follow-up 
structure. The HRC practice regarding follow-up on mandates and their recommendations is 
inconsistent and the positive impact of the investigations could not always be linked to the HRC 
follow-up activities. 
With regard to referring cases to the ICC, although this has happened before with cases 
independently investigated by the UN, this has not been the case so far with HRC investigations. 
In some cases, e.g the DPRK the HRC has shown consistent follow-up that has translated into 
added discussion by other bodies of the UN, most notably the Security Council. 
It was interesting to trace some recommendations that have also been made lately by the HRC 
investigations to third states to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes that had been committed in 
the state under investigation. The explanations for these steps in the respective reports attest to 
fatigue due to not being able to obtain any relevant action in the highest UN structures, i.e the 
Security Council. Although there are yet no significant signs of this, the calls for third state 
prosecutions and the readiness to surrender information to these countries by the investigations 
may become an increasing means to overcome the deadlock of the Security Council in 
addressing impunity. 
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The third chapter of the thesis focussed on examining the criticism of the HRC investigations 
and the constraints of the role of the investigations in conducting their work to promote 
accountability for human rights violations. As the investigations may lead to ascertaining 
responsibility of individuals, including the political and military leaders of states, the criticism 
towards the investigations has sharpened. Not surprisingly, the credibility of the investigations 
and the reports is lessened in rhetoric by referring to the bias of both the conduct of the 
investigations and the investigators; the HRC is blamed for selectiveness. In order to counter 
this criticism, no common agreement emerged on whether it would be better to have more or 
less rules on the conduct and the methodology of the investigations. 
As the results of the investigations are applied throughout the UN system, I proceeded to briefly 
examine the conduct of the UN Security Council. Although the Security Council has treated 
issues pertaining to individual responsibility, its practice was found to be inconsistent and, at 
times, contradictory. I further analysed the question of why the HRC is used for investigations 
if they do not manage to produce actual results. From the perspective of the politisation of 
human rights, or rather the „political“ inherent in human rights, it can be assumed that the 
investigations are conducted by the HRC by states exactly because they do not „cost“ anything 
to the states. 
Further, I analysed the possibilities of how the HRC investigations actually may assist in 
reaching accountability in cases of violations of international law. First, I examined the 
framework of international law, whereby it emerged that the sovereign still reigns in the 
investigations of gross human rights violations and is unwilling to leave decisions on these 
cases to an independent international adjudicative body. Further, the principle of responsibility 
to protect may have legitimised the desire of some states to intervene in cases of gross 
violations, although the ultimate use of this principle remains at the hands of the Security 
Council and therefore the practice application of the R2P principle shall remain unforeseeable 
and inconsistent. The emergence and evolution of the individual responsibility under 
international law has been described as a „justice cascade“, which may well enhance the role 
of the HRC investigations in the bigger picture. The HRC may be a stream in this cascade due 
to the perception by the members of the HRC of the need to take action on accountability issues. 
The investigations further play a part in the overarching UN initiative on the rule of law. 
It is clear that the investigations by themselves do not create accountability, but that this requires 
assistance from other entities. Thus, I next turned to inspect ways in which the HRC 
investigations may be used, regardless of their effectuation by the HRC. First, I clearly stated 
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the fact that while the HRC investigations do not possess judicial capacities, they do not bear 
with them the same legal implications as international criminal investigations, and, thus, the 
HRC investigations should be considered as promoting accountability. 
From the ensuing analysis on the use of the HRC investigations in relation to the ICC it emerged 
that there is no considerable investigative cooperation between these entities. Still, the ICC may 
use the results of the HRC investigations in its pre-preliminary investigations. As criminal 
investigations differ from human rights investigations, the comparison of the evidence gathered 
may prove difficult. At the same time, the HRC investigators could also stand as witnesses in 
the ICC proceedings. I also made a point on the fact that, as both, the ICC and the HRC 
investigate mostly grave violations of international law, these entities may not be used for 
investigations of „lesser“ crimes, and that this raises issues regarding the indivisibility of human 
rights. With regard to the transitional justice framework I found that the HRC investigations 
may have an input but, as with the ICC, the criteria for investigations differ, this time with the 
HRC having a more rigid set of rules, including on methodology. 
All in all, there seems to be creativity at play in the UN concerning addressing human rights 
violations, taking into account the ad hoc manner in which the investigations’ mechanism has 
developed over time, including in the HRC. From the case-law of the HRC on investigations it 
became clear that the recommendations of the investigations have gone further from what the 
UN has provided. Also, it was not possible to arrive at a certain conclusion on the link between 
the investigations and the few positive outcomes. Alas, the lack of follow-up has not always 
resulted from the inaction of the HRC, which has frequently used means available to it to refer 
cases to the General Assembly and ultimately to the Security Council. As it appeared, some 
investigations have started to „outsource“ the prosecution of individuals to third states under 
the principle of universal jurisdiction. The „fig leaf“ of inaction might not hang over the HRC 
but rather somewhere else in the UN.  
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ÜRO Inimõiguste nõukogu uurimiskehamite roll: enam või vähem vastutust 
rahvusvahelise õiguse rikkumise korral? 
SUMMARY  
Rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse ja inimõiguste rikkumistega tegelemisel ning rikkumiste 
puhul vastutuse kohaldamiseks on ÜRO ja täpsemalt selle Inimõiguste nõukogu (IÕN) üha 
enam hakanud kasutama vastavaid uurimiskehameid olukorras, kus riigid inimõigusi räigelt 
rikuvad, kuid selle eest vastutust ei võta. Rahvusvahelise kogukonna säärane tegevus tugineb 
vajadusele saada tõest informatsiooni väidetavate rikkumiste kohta, et tagada inimeste kaitseks 
vajalike meetmete rakendamine. Karistamatuse vastu võimalikult parimal viisil võitlemiseks ja 
ohvrite abistamiseks peaks uurimistegevus sobituma olemasolevasse ÜRO ja rahvusvahelise 
kriminaalõiguse süsteemi. Samas on rikkumisi tõendavate uurimiste kasvava hulga juures olnud 
märgatavalt vähem uurimiste tegelikke väljundeid. 
Magistritöös uurisin IÕNi poolt volitatud uurimisi, et teha kindlaks, kas IÕNi tegevus 
uurimiskehamite loomisel ja uurimiskehamite uurimistulemuste üle järelevalve teostamisel on 
aidanud kaasa õiguste tagamisele või on see pigem nö viigileht IÕNi tegevusetuse varjamiseks. 
Ühtlasi uurisin ka uurimiste rolli laiemalt. 
Esimeses alapeatükis tõin välja ÜRO uurimiste alused, millest ühe osa moodustavad IÕNi 
uurimised. Faktiuurimisi tudeerides selgus esmalt, et ÜROs ilmselt ei mõeldud selle loomisel 
antud uurimistegevusele. ÜRO harta alused faktiuurimisteks on kaudsed ning üldsõnalised. 
Sama kehtib IÕNi loomise dokumentide osas. Samas on ÜRO erinevad kehamid, nii 
Peasekretär, Julgeolekunõukogu, Peaassamblee kui toonane Inimõiguste komisjon tegelenud 
alates 1960-ndatest uurimistega, millest lõviosa moodustavad tänapäeval IÕNi algatatud 
uurimised. Ühtlasi selgus, et ÜROs ja laiemalt puudub ühene arusaam faktiuurimiste 
määratlusest. Samas on selle sisu muutunud alates Haagi konventsioonide vastuvõtmisest 20. 
sajandi alguses, kuna uurimiste rakendamiseks pole enam tarvis riikidevahelist vaidlust ega 
riigi nõusolekut uurimise läbiviimiseks. Ad hoc iseloomu tõttu on uurimiste kohta alles 
hiljaaegu uurimiste läbiviimise kohta avaldatud soovituslikku metodoloogiat. 
Järgmisena pöördusin IÕNi uurimiste kaasuste poole, mida on alates 2006. aastast 20 ringis. 
IÕNi poolt antud volitusi uurides proovisin tuvastada, millise eesmärgiga IÕN uurimisi on 
loonud. Peagi selgus, et mandaatide enamus oli üldsõnaline, kuid oli ka väga üksikasjalisi 
nõudmisi, mh kuritegude ja nende toimepanijate tuvastamiseks välistamaks karistamatust ning 
võttes kurjategijad vastutusele. Ühtlasi oli võimalik tuvastada seos inimõiguste uurimiste ja 
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vastutuse (i.k. accountability) vahel. Kurjategijate tuvastamise aspekti võib pidada ÜRO 
uurimistes oluliseks muutuseks. See omakorda tekitab küsimusi mh uurimistulemuste 
õiguslikust staatusest ning nende tähendusest väidetavate õigusrikkujate menetlusega seotud 
õigustele. Antud küsimusi tuleb ÜROs ning õigusalases kirjanduses veel lähemalt lahata. 
Iisraeli kui IÕNi päevakorra alaline punkt ka pärast Inimõiguste komisjoni töö lakkamist on 
IÕN palunud uurida mitmel korral. Antud uurimised on pälvinud tähelepanu just hulga ning 
ühekülgse lähenemise eest uurimissubjekti määramisel. Iisraeli kaasuseid on lihtsasti võimalik 
kasutada IÕNi diskrediteerimiseks ning valikuliste otsuste näitlikustamiseks. 
IÕN on uurimiste subjektidena kasutanud ka riigiväliseid ühendusi, nt Boko Harami ja ISILit. 
Kuigi volituste andmisel on resolutsioonis välja toodud riigi kui inimõigusi tagava üksuse 
primaarsus, ei kuulunud riigid nende volituste hulka uurimise subjektina.  
Kuna IÕN oli jätnud volitustes sõnastuse tõttu palju tõlgendusruumi, keskendusin töö järgmises 
osas IÕN uurijate tõlgendustele sellest, milleks neid oli volitatud. Mitmel juhul olid uurijad 
volitusi ületanud või neid täpsustanud. Tihti ei olnud uurimisega olnud võimalik katta kogu 
uurimiseks volitatud ala või katta uurimist sisuliselt vajalikul määral. Põhjuseks toodi piiratud 
ressursid, eriti ajalises mõttes. 
Lisaks selgus, et uurimistega ei esitata mitte ainult faktilisi asjaolusid, vaid ka nende analüüsi 
ning järeldusi. Antud tegevus ei olnud mitte alati kooskõlas volitustega, mistõttu täitsid uurijad 
justkui õigusliku iseloomuga rolli. Juhtus et uurijad kvalifitseerisid kas kuritegusid või nende 
toimepanijaid. Iisraeli puhul käsitleti selle kõrval ka teisi konflikti osapooli. 
Muuhulgas uurisin uurimisvolituse elluviimise võimalikke takistusi. Koostöö riigiga ei 
tundunud olevat uurimise läbiviimise või selle usaldusväärsuse seisukohast oluline, kuigi 
takistas esmase informatsiooni kättesaadavust. Selliste pehmemate seisukohtade tekkimisele 
võis kaasa aidata frustratsiooni element, mis riiki mittelubamisel uurijaid varasemalt korduvalt 
oli nörritanud. 
Inimõiguste uurimised tekitavad alati kõrgendatud ootusi. Järgmisena uurisin samme, mida 
IÕN oli võtnud peale uurimiste lõppemist uurimisaruannete osas selleks, et paremini rakendada 
neis toodud soovitusi, või kuidas IÕN oli kasutanud aruannet inimõigusi puudutavate 
rikkumiste heastamiseks. Mõnel puhul oli IÕNi jätkutegevus aset leidnud, kuid teistel juhtudel 
olid uurimised jätkuks eelnevatele uurimistele, andes pigem tunnistust olukorra 
mittelahenemisest. Selgus, et tihti polnud probleem IÕNi poolses tegevuses, kuivõrd asjaolus, 
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et ei olnud võimalik saavutada tegelikke tulemusi. Uurimissoovituste rakendamisel oli tehtud 
edusamme, nt Põhja-Korea puhul, kuigi see oli sisult uurimise jätkustruktuuri loomine. IÕNi 
üldine praktika uurimistulemustega edasi tegelemisel oli ebaühtlane ning uurimiste positiivset 
mõju polnud alati võimalik seostada IÕNi jätkutegevustega. 
Kaasuste Rahvusvahelisele kriminaalkohtule (ICC) suunamist polnud IÕNi tegutsemisaja 
jooksul juhtunud, kuigi suunamisi on tulnud ette ÜRO teiste kehamite moodustatud 
uurimiskomisjonide töö tulemusel. Põhja-Korea puhul on IÕN saavutanud selle, et antud 
küsimust arutatakse ÜRO teistes kehamites, mh Julgeolekunõukogus. 
Huvitav oli jälgida arengut, mille kohaselt on hiljuti uurimiskehamid soovitanud kolmandatel 
riikidel kurjategijaid kohtu alla anda. See muutus võib samuti olla tulenenud mõningasest 
frustratsioonist ÜRO teist kehamite, eelkõige Julgeolekunõukoguga kohase koostöö 
puudumisest. Kuigi selle kohta puuduvad määravad märgid, võib kolmandatele riikidele tehtud 
üleskutsetes ning valmiduses neile selleks ka vajalikku informatsiooni anda näidata valmidust 
vältida Julgeolekunõukogu ummikteed karistamatusega võitlemisel. 
Magistritöö kolmas peatükk keskendus IÕNi uurimiste vastu suunatud kriitika uurimisele ning 
uurimiste rolliga seotud piirangutele nende ülesannete teostamisel vastutuse kohaldamiseks 
inimõiguste rikkumiste puhul. Kuna uurimised võivad viia isikute, sh riigijuhtidele 
süüdistamiseni, on kriitika uurimiste suhtes teravnenud. Mitte üllatavalt püütakse pisendada 
uurimiste ja aruannete usaldusväärsust viidates nii uurimiste läbiviimise kui läbiviijate 
erapoolikusele. IÕNi seevastu süüdistatakse valikulises käitumises. Antud puhul ollakse eri 
meelt uurimistele kohalduvate reeglite juurde tekitamises või eemaldamises. 
Kuna uurimiste tulemusi rakendatakse üldises ÜRO süsteemis, pöördusin järgmisena 
Julgeolekunõukogu uurimise juurde. Kuigi Julgeolekunõukogu on arutanud isikute vastutusega 
seonduvaid küsimusi, on sellekohane praktika ebajärjepidev ning kohati vastuoluline. 
Järgnevalt arutlesin küsimuse üle, miks siis IÕNi kasutatakse uurimiste tarbeks, kui need ei 
tundu olevat tulemuslikud. Inimõiguste politiseerituse lähtekohast analüüsides võib arvata, et 
uurimisi korraldatakse IÕNis just seetõttu, et need ei „maksa“ riikidele midagi. 
Edasi kaalusin võimalusi, kuidas IÕNi uurimised saaksid panustada rahvusvahelise õiguse 
rikkujate vastutusele võtmiseks. Selleks uurisin esmalt rahvusvahelise õiguse vastavat 
raamistikku. Analüüsis ilmnes riikide suveräänsuse suhteline monopol räigete inimõiguste 
rikkumiste uurimisel ning ilmne tahte puudumine selliste olukordade lahendamiseks andmiseks 
sõltumatutele kehamitele. „Kohustus kaitsta“ põhimõte (i.k. responsibility to protect, R2P) võis 
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olevat mõnes mõttes legitimeerinud riikide soovi sekkuda räigete rikkumiste puhul, kuid selle 
põhimõtte rakendumine on taaskord Julgeolekunõukogu meelevallas ning seetõttu on R2P 
võimalik rakendamine ettenägematu. Isikute kriminaalvastutuse nähtuse tekkimist ja 
süvenemist rahvusvahelises õiguses on kirjeldatud „õiguse kärestikuna“, mis võib samuti tõsta 
IÕNi uurimiste tähtsust suures pildis. Samuti ehk panustab IÕN kärestikku, kuna arvab endal 
sellise ülesande olevat. Uurimistel on samuti roll ÜRO õigusriigi initsiatiivi seisukohast. 
On selge, et uurimised eraldiseisvalt ei tekita vastutust, vaid selleks on tarvis teiste kehamite 
abi. Seetõttu pöördusin järgmisena uurima mooduseid, kuidas IÕNi uurimisi on võimalik 
kasutada, sõltumata nende rakendamisest IÕNi poolt. Esmalt käsitlesin uuesti tõsiasja, et kuna 
IÕNi uurimistel puudub õiguslik pädevus, ei ole neil sarnast õiguslikku jõudu nagu 
rahvusvahelisel kriminaaluurimistel ning seetõttu peaks IÕNi uurimisi pigem vaatama 
vastutuse edendamise seisukohast. 
Edasisest analüüsist IÕNi uurimiste kasutamisest seoses ICCga selgus, et IÕNi ja ICC vahel 
puudub uurimisalane koostöö. Samuti selgus, et ICC võiks kasutada IÕNi uurimisi enda 
kriminaaluurimiste eelse uurimise käigus. Kuna kriminaaluurimine ja inimõiguste alane 
uurimine erinevad kriteeriumite poolest, võib nende võrdlemine osutuda keeruliseks või 
kohatuks. Samas võiksid IÕNi uurijad vabalt vajadusel ICCs ütlusi anda. Ühtlasi pöörasin 
tähelepanu asjaolule, et kuna nii ICC kui IÕN uurivad peaasjalikult ainult kõige räigemaid 
rikkumisi, ei pruugi nendest organitest olla abi „vähemate“ rikkumiste puhul, mis omakorda ei 
pruugi olla kooskõlas inimõiguste jagamatuse põhimõttega. Üleminekuõigusega seotud 
temaatika osas leidsin, et IÕNi uurimiste panus on võimalik, kuid, nagu selgus ICC puhul, on 
uurimiskriteeriumite sisu mõnevõrra erinev, seekord rangemana IÕNi puhul. 
Kokkuvõtteks võib tõdeda, et ÜRO on inimõiguste rikkumiste adresseerimisel näidanud üles 
loovust, arvestades uurimismehhanismide kaasusepõhist arengut. Analüüsitud IÕNi kaasustest 
nähtus, et uurimiste soovitused on läinud kaugemale sellest, mida ÜRO on võimaldanud. 
Samuti polnud võimalik jõuda kindla tõdemuseni uurimiste ja väheste positiivsete tulemuste 
seosest. Samas ei ole rakendamatuse taga alati IÕNi püüdmatus. IÕN on tihti kasutanud temale 
võimalikke vahendeid, et suunata juhtum Peaassambleesse ning Julgeolekunõukogusse. Nagu 
ilmnes, on mõned uurimised hakanud ÜRO tegevusetuse tõttu suunama isikute kohtu alla 
andmist kolmandatesse riikidesse üleilmse kohtualluvuse alusel. Seetõttu ei pruugi kokkuvõttes 
too tegevusetuse viigileht paikneda IÕNi kohal, vaid mujal ÜROs.  
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ANNEX. Investigations mandated by the Human Rights Council 
Year Mandating authority Commissions/Missions Reports   
2015 
 
 
 
 
2014 
Human Rights Council 
resolution S-23/L.1 of 1 
Apr. 2015  (unedited 
version) 
Human Rights Council 
resolution  
S-22/1 of 1 Sep. 2014 
OHCHR to collect information from countries 
affected by Boko Haram (Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Niger, Chad) 
 
OHCHR Investigation mission to Iraq 
Report not yet available 
 
 
 
 
Report A/HRC/28/18 
2014 Human Rights Council 
resolution S-21/1 of 23 
July 2014 
Independent international commission of 
inquiry to investigate all violations of 
international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
  
Report not yet available 
2014 Human Rights Council 
resolution 26/24 of 27 
June 2014 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate all 
alleged violations of human rights in Eritrea 
Report not yet available 
2014    Human Rights Council 
resolution 25/1 of 9 Apr. 
2014 
OHCHR investigation on Sri-Lanka Report delayed (A/HRC/28/23 
of 27 Feb. 2015) 
2013 High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
Human Rights Council 
resolution 23/18 of 13 
June 2013 
OHCHR Fact-finding mission to Central 
African Republic 
Report A/HRC/24/59 of 12 Sep. 
2013 
2013 Human Rights Council 
resolution 22/13 of 21 
Mar. 2013 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Reports A/HRC/25/CRP.1 and 
A/HRC/25/63 of 7 Feb. 2014 
 
2012 Human Rights Council 
resolution 19/17 of 22 
Mar. 2012 
Independent international fact-finding mission 
to investigate the implications of the Israeli 
settlements on the civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights of the Palestinian 
people throughout the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including East Jerusalem 
Report A/HRC/22/63 of 7 Feb. 
2013 
2011 Human Rights Council  
resolutions S-17/1 of 23 
Aug. 2011; 
19/22 of 23 Mar. 2012; 
21/26 of 28 Sep. 2012; 
22/24 of 22 Mar. 2013; 
25/23 of 28 Mar. 2014 
Independent international commission of 
inquiry on Syrian Arab Republic 
Reports: A/HRC/28/69 of 5 Feb. 
2015; 
A/HRC/27/CRP.3 of 19 Nov. 
2014: 
A/HRC/27/60 of 13 Aug. 2014; 
A/HRC/25/65 of 12 Feb. 2014; 
A/HRC/24/46 of 16 Aug. 2013; 
A/HRC/23/58 of 18 July 2013; 
A/HRC/22/CRP.1 of 11 Mar. 
2013; 
A/HRC/22/59 of 5 Feb. 2013; 
A/HRC/21/50 of 16 Aug. 2012; 
A/HRC/20/CRP.1 of 26 June 
2012; 
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A/HRC/19/80 of 8 Mar. 2012; 
A/HRC/19/69 of 22 Feb. 2012; 
A/HRC/19/79 of 16 Dec. 2011; 
A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 of 23 
Nov. 2011 
2011 Human Rights Council 
resolutions 
17/17 of 17 June 2011; 
S-15/1 of 25 Feb. 2011 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya Reports A/HRC/19/68 of 28 
Jan. 2014,  A/HRC/17/44, 12 
Jan. 2012 
2011 Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/25 of 25 
Mar. 2011 
International Independent Commission of 
Inquiry on the Situation of Human Rights 
in Côte d'Ivoire 
Report A/HRC/17/48, 1 July 
2011  
2011 Human Rights Council  
resolution S-16/1 of 29 
Apr. 2011 
  
OHCHR Fact-finding mission to the Syrian 
Arab Republic 
Report A/HRC/18/53 of 15 Sep. 
2011 
2010 Human Rights Council 
resolutions 13/9 of 25 
Mar. 2010 
Committee of independent experts to monitor 
and assess any domestic, legal or other 
proceedings undertaken by both 
the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian side 
Report A/HRC/15/50 of 23 Sep. 
2010; 
Report A/HRC/16/24 of 5 May 
2011 
2010 Human Rights Council 
resolution 14/1 of 2 June 
2010 
  
International fact-finding mission to 
investigate violations of international law, 
including international humanitarian and 
human rights law, resulting from the Israeli 
attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying 
humanitarian assistance 
Report A/HRC/15/21 of 27 Sep. 
2010 
2009 Human Rights Council 
resolution 12/14 of 1 Oct. 
2009 
OHCHR Mission on situation of human rights 
in Honduras since the coup d'état on 28 June 
2009  
Report A/HRC/13/66 of 3 Mar. 
2010 
2009 Human Rights Council 
resolution S-9/1 of 12 Jan. 
2009 
UN Fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict Report A/HRC/12/48 of 25 Sep. 
2009 
2006 Human Rights Council 
decision S-4/101 of 13 
Dec. 2006 
  
High-level Mission on the situation of human 
rights in Darfur  
Report A/HRC/4/80 of 9 Mar. 
2007 
2006 Human Rights Council 
resolution S-3/1 of 15 
Nov. 2006 
  
High-level fact-finding mission to Beit 
Hanoun  
Reports A/HRC/5/20 of 18 June 
2007 and A/HRC/9/26 of 1 Sep. 
2008 
2006 Human Rights Council 
resolution S-2/1 of 11 
Aug. 2006 
Commission of inquiry on Lebanon  Report A/HRC/3/2 of 23 Nov. 
2006 
Source: UNOG Library Resources 
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